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This paper reviews ﬁ  nancial stability challenges 
in the EU candidate countries Croatia, Turkey 
and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
It examines the ﬁ  nancial sectors in these three 
economies, which, while at very different stages 
of development and embedded in quite diverse 
economic settings, are all in a process of rapid 
ﬁ  nancial deepening. This manifests itself most 
clearly in the rapid pace of growth in credit to 
the private sector. This process of ﬁ  nancial 
deepening is largely a natural and welcome 
catching-up phenomenon, but it has also 
increased the credit risks borne by the banking 
sectors in the three economies. These credit 
risks are compounded by the widespread use of 
foreign currency-denominated or -indexed loans, 
leaving unhedged bank customers exposed to 
potential swings in exchange rates or foreign 
interest rates. Moreover, these ﬁ  nancial  risks 
form part of a broader nexus of vulnerabilities 
in the economies concerned, in particular the 
external vulnerabilities arising from increasing 
private sector external indebtedness. That 
said, the paper also ﬁ  nds that the authorities in 
the three countries have taken several policy 
actions to reduce these ﬁ  nancial and external 
vulnerabilities and to strengthen the resilience 
of the ﬁ  nancial sectors. 
Key words: Europe, banking sector, vulnerability 
indicators, capital inﬂ  ows, emerging markets
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: F32, F41, G21, G288
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SUMMARY
This paper provides an assessment of ﬁ  nancial 
stability issues in the EU candidate countries 
Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and Turkey. It examines potential 
sources of vulnerability from a macroeconomic 
perspective as well as ﬁ  nancial sector challenges, 
highlighting risks pertaining to each country 
individually or to the group as a whole.
Since the beginning of the decade, Croatia, 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
and Turkey have experienced a signiﬁ  cant 
pace of ﬁ   nancial deepening, notwithstanding 
considerable differences in their level of 
economic development and the economic 
circumstances they are confronted with. While 
the expansion of the ﬁ  nancial sector in these 
countries can per se be regarded as beneﬁ  cial 
for their progress towards mature market 
economies, it also entails a range of risks, 
requiring adequate responses by policy-makers 
and supervisory authorities.
Against the background of the ﬁ  nancial market 
turbulence unfolding since mid-2007, negative 
spillovers from an expected global slowdown 
may negatively affect the economic prospects of 
all three EU candidate countries. In particular, 
sizeable current account deﬁ  cits in Croatia and 
Turkey entail a strong dependency on external 
capital  ﬂ   ows. Additionally, recently rising 
inﬂ  ationary pressures and potential delays in the 
implementation of structural reforms may further 
contribute to a worsening economic outlook.
Turning to speciﬁ  c risks in the ﬁ  nancial sector, 
rapid credit growth in all three countries may 
have weakened the quality of banks’ loan 
portfolios in the face of competition for new 
customers and capacity constraints regarding 
a proper evaluation of credit risk. Moreover, a 
heavy reliance of the observed credit extension 
on loans linked to foreign currency might 
hamper the debt servicing capabilities of 
unhedged borrowers in case of adverse exchange 
rate or foreign interest rate movements, thereby 
indirectly impairing the banking sector’s asset 
quality. Lastly, banks’ dependence on foreign 
debt could prove disadvantageous in case of a 
signiﬁ  cant deterioration of the global ﬁ  nancial 
and economic environment, rendering this 
source of ﬁ  nancing more difﬁ  cult or impossible 
to obtain.
Despite these challenges, stress tests and 
sensitivity analyses conducted by the respective 
national central banks and the IMF point to a 
substantial resistance of EU candidate countries’ 
ﬁ  nancial systems to adverse shocks, which is also 
conﬁ  rmed by standard indicators of asset quality, 
capital adequacy and proﬁ   tability. In addition, 
major difﬁ  culties in raising the necessary ﬁ  nancing 
to account for external imbalances, particularly 
the banking sector’s stock of foreign debt, have 
not materialised so far. Besides, the authorities 
in the three countries have taken several policy 
actions, addressing existing ﬁ  nancial and external 
vulnerabilities and strengthening the resilience of 
the ﬁ  nancial sectors.
Nevertheless, in light of the risks currently 
prevailing, continued analysis and monitoring in 
order to avoid a disproportionate accumulation 
of ﬁ  nancial and external vulnerabilities, while at 
the same time guaranteeing a sustained pace of 
ﬁ  nancial deepening, appears to be the key future 
policy challenge in EU candidate countries.9
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1   INTRODUCTION
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper reviews ﬁ  nancial stability challenges 
in Croatia, Turkey and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of  Macedonia. All three countries 
enjoy EU candidate country status, albeit 
with varying degrees of progress towards 
EU membership. Croatia, an EU candidate 
country since June 2004, opened accession 
negotiations on 3 October 2005, which 
entered their detailed phase in June 2006. By 
June 2008, 20 of the 35 chapters negotiated in 
the framework of the acquis communautaire 
had been opened.1  The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia ofﬁ   cially applied for 
EU membership on 22 March 2004 and became 
a candidate country in December 2005, marking 
the end of the process that began in 2001 with 
the signing of a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA). The European Commission 
emphasised that negotiations could be opened 
once the country has reached a sufﬁ  cient 
degree of compliance with the membership 
criteria, but without mentioning a speciﬁ  c date.2 
Turkey started EU accession negotiations on 
3 October 2005 and has been recognised as 
a candidate state for EU membership since 
1999. Turkey’s formal accession talks began 
on 12 June 2006, but were suspended on eight 
out of the acquis’ 35 chapters due to the failure 
to open Turkish ports and airports to Cypriot 
vessels and planes. Nevertheless, screening and 
opening of other chapters is continuing.
This paper provides an update of ECB (2006) and 
complements this earlier paper with a more 
rigorous assessment of certain market segments 
and topical issues.3 It starts by identifying 
potential macroeconomic sources of vulnerability 
in the respective candidate countries. A ﬁ  rst 
vulnerability relates to potential negative 
spillovers from the expected global slowdown. 
The three candidate countries have so far 4 not felt 
any strong impact of worsening external 
conditions and the global ﬁ  nancial turmoil, but 
the probability of a negative spillover has 
increased. A second macroeconomic risk relates 
to the external imbalances of the candidate 
countries, with particularly large current account 
deﬁ  cits in Croatia (around 8% of GDP in 2007) 
and Turkey (5.5% of GDP). A third 
macroeconomic risk stems from increasing 
inﬂ  ationary pressures, with CPI inﬂ  ation in early 
2008 reaching multi-year highs in Croatia and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. A 
fourth risk relates to potential delays in the 
implementation of the structural reform agenda 
across the three countries. 
The paper then examines the structure of 
ﬁ  nancial systems in each of the three countries. 
While the three candidate countries differ 
widely in their economic signiﬁ  cance  and 
the level of development of their ﬁ  nancial 
sector (see Table 1), they are nevertheless 
characterised by some common trends prevalent 
in their ﬁ   nancial system, including ﬁ  nancial 
deepening (as evidenced by the growing size of 
the banking sector), continuing consolidation 
in the banking sector, a continued shift towards 
privately-owned banking systems, a move 
towards core banking activities (i.e. lending to 
the private sector rather than to governments) 
and deepening integration in international 
ﬁ   nancial markets through increased foreign 
bank ownership.
This process of ﬁ  nancial deepening reﬂ  ects a 
natural and welcome catching-up phenomenon, 
but it is not without risks. The major ﬁ  nancial 
stability challenge relates to the management of 
credit risk. Growth in credit to the private sector 
has been relatively brisk in all three countries 
over the past three years. This could potentially 
force banks to relax lending standards, weaken 
asset classiﬁ   cation and provisioning, and 
reach out to new customers that lack a strong 
credit standing. Shortages of well-trained loan 
ofﬁ  cers, the short credit history of many bank 
Currently, the Croatian government expects to ﬁ  nalise accession  1 
negotiations by the end of 2009 and to become an EU Member 
State by 2010 or 2011.
Inter alia, the determination of a date for opening accession  2 
negotiations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
also rests on the EU’s future enlargement strategy and an 
effective implementation of the SAA.
The countries covered in ECB (2006) were Bulgaria, Croatia,  3 
Romania and Turkey.
The cut-off date for this paper is March 2008. 4 10
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customers, possible gaps in documentation and 
limited experience so far with credit registers 
may further aggravate the risks in the banks’ 
loan portfolios.
The paper also examines the extent to which 
credit risk is compounded by the widespread use 
of foreign currency-denominated or -indexed 
loans, which may create currency mismatches 
for non-banks and indirect credit risks for banks. 
While currency mismatches tend to be limited in 
the banks’ balance sheets, banks face substantial 
indirect credit risk through possible strains to 
the debt servicing capacity of their clients.
Strong credit growth has also been coupled 
with rising foreign indebtedness of the banking 
sector. While foreign ﬁ   nancing has been a 
stable source of funding, it could come under 
strain if the global ﬁ   nancial and economic 
environment were to deteriorate signiﬁ  cantly. 
A particular role is played here by lending 
within banking groups, often originating from 
parent banks incorporated in the EU. While the 
global ﬁ  nancial market turmoil observed since 
mid-2007 has so far not forced parent banks to 
withdraw capital from the candidate countries, 
the risk of more adverse developments in the 
external ﬁ  nancing of banks remains relevant. 
Taking a forward-looking perspective, the 
paper reviews the results of stress tests and 
sensitivity analyses conducted by the IMF and 
by central banks. These tests, coupled with 
macro-prudential indicators, suggest that the 
banking systems have some capacity to withstand 
adverse shocks. Relatively high proﬁ  tability and 
adequate capital provide some cushion against 
deterioration in loan portfolios. Those stress 
tests and sensitivity analyses are however to 
be interpreted with caution as they may not 
reﬂ   ect the full spectrum of possible adverse 
developments, given also the limited historical 
experience with credit cycle downturns in the 
candidate countries.
The paper is structured as follows. Sections 2, 3 
and 4 are devoted to individual countries and 
discuss the macroeconomic environment, 
review structural developments in the ﬁ  nancial 
system, assess the risks and shock-absorbing 
capacity of the banking system, and provide 
a concluding assessment. These country 
sections are complemented with a review of 
cross-country themes in Section 5, covering: 
(i) the implications of the global ﬁ  nancial market 
turmoil; (ii) the ﬁ  nancial stability implications 
of the use of foreign currencies; (iii) domestic 
credit growth and foreign borrowing; (iv) risks 
from household borrowing and debt; and (v) a 
comparison of ﬁ  nancial stability indicators with 
the EU Member States in central and eastern 
Europe. Section 6 concludes.
Table 1 EU candidate countries: economic and financial significance
(2007)
Croatia FYR Macedonia Turkey
Population million 4.4 2.0 71.3
GDP USD billion 51.4 7.5 663.4
Trade 1) USD billion 46.1 7.2 277.4
Banking sector assets USD billion 68.0 4.8 453.7
Stock market capitalisation 2) USD billion 29.0 1.1 162.4
Bond and money market capitalisation 3) USD billion 17.0 0.4 260.5
Sources: IMF, Standard & Poor’s, BIS and own calculations.
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2   CROATIA
2 CROATIA
2.1  THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
In 2006 and 2007 the Croatian economy 
maintained the strong growth momentum seen 
since the beginning of the decade, with the year 
2007 even bringing a substantial acceleration 
of economic growth (see Table 2). Domestic 
demand remained the main pillar of growth and 
private consumption replaced investment as the 
key driver of growth against the background 
of brisk credit expansion, a strong pick-up 
in disposable income and improved labour 
market conditions. 
Booming domestic demand, reaccelerating 
credit growth in 2005 and 2006 (both in the 
corporate and retail sectors), increased cross-
border borrowing by domestic private non-
banks in 2007 and limited room for independent 
interest rate policy under the tightly managed 
ﬂ   oat created a challenging environment for 
monetary policy. The Croatian National Bank 
(CNB) successfully maintained low inﬂ  ation in 
2006 and the ﬁ  rst three quarters of 2007, with 
consumer price inﬂ  ation falling gradually from a 
temporary peak in 2005 to below 3% on average 
in 2007. However, reﬂ   ecting adverse global 
food and energy price developments, inﬂ  ation 
accelerated in the ﬁ  nal quarter of 2007, reaching 
a seven-year high of nearly 6% in year-on-year 
terms at the end of the year. 
On the back of buoyant real GDP growth, 
Croatia’s headline ﬁ  scal balances continued to 
improve in 2006 and 2007. Fiscal developments 
were to a large extent underpinned by revenue 
over-performance, with the bulk of extra 
revenues being spent in the areas of health 
care, education and agriculture. In this regard, 
the CNB’s limited room for manoeuvre against 
the background of the tightly managed ﬂ  oat and 
the country’s high external imbalances would 
warrant a more prudent ﬁ   scal course. Public 
ﬁ   nances are still burdened with subsidies for 
various industries (e.g. shipping), high health 
and pension commitments as well as substantial 
quasi-ﬁ   scal expenditures. Ensuring lasting 
ﬁ  scal consolidation through spending restraint 
therefore remains an important challenge.
The acceleration of domestic demand triggered 
a further deterioration in Croatia’s external 
position in 2006. The current account deﬁ  cit 
reached almost 8% of GDP in 2006 and 
increased further to over 8.5% of GDP in 2007. 
However, thanks to sizeable capital injections 
into the banking sector and progress made in 
the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, 
foreign direct investment inﬂ  ows  accelerated 
substantially and provided full coverage of the 
current account deﬁ  cit in both 2006 and 2007. 
Croatia’s gross external indebtedness increased 
further over the period from 2005 to 2007, 
although at a somewhat slower pace than before. 
The composition of debt also changed markedly 
Table 2 Croatia: main macroeconomic indicators
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Real GDP growth %, y-o-y 4.4 5.6 5.3 4.3 4.3 4.8 5.6
CPI inﬂ  ation %, y-o-y, period average 3.8 1.7 1.8 2.1 3.4 3.2 2.8
Money market overnight interest rate %, period average 3.1 1.8 3.0 4.6 2.3 1.6 4.1
Exchange rate HRK-EUR, period average 7.5 7.4 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.3
Nominal effective exchange rate Index (2001 = 100), period average 100.0 102.2 105.3 109.1 110.6 112.0 114.5
Current account balance % of GDP -3.7 -8.6 -7.2 -5.0 -6.3 -7.9 -8.6
FDI inﬂ  ow % of GDP 6.6 4.7 6.7 3.3 4.7 8.0 9.7
Gross external debt % of GDP 61.4 61.9 75.8 80.0 82.3 85.6 87.8
General government balance 1) % of GDP -6.8 -3.1 -3.9 -3.9 -2.8 -1.8 0.6
General government debt 2) % of GDP 51.1 51.0 51.2 51.6 52.2 49.5 46.8
Sources: Croatian National Bank and Central Bureau of Statistics.
1) Cash basis.
2) Includes general government debt, Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development debt and general government guaranteed debt.12
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over the period, with a notable increase in the 
external debt of non-bank corporations (see the 
discussion in Section 5.3).
In accordance with its exchange rate policy 
objective, the CNB kept the exchange rate of the 
kuna largely stable against the euro. The CNB 
withstood substantial appreciation pressure 
on the kuna in the course of 2006 and 2007, 
arising from higher tourism receipts, increased 
privatisation-related capital inﬂ  ows,  capital 
increases at several foreign banks’ subsidiaries, 
a number of domestic government bond 
issues and stepped-up foreign borrowing of 
banks and corporations. The foreign exchange 
market interventions of the CNB helped to 
avoid a deterioration of the country’s external 
competitiveness.
2.2  THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: STRUCTURE AND 
DEVELOPMENTS
Following major transformations in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, the Croatian banking 
sector saw no further fundamental structural 
adjustment over the past few years. Merger and 
acquisition activity slowed and the number of 
banks has fallen since 2005 by just 1 to 33 at 
end-2007 (see Table 3), a ﬁ  gure which seems 
still high in a regional context. The Croatian 
banking industry continues to be dominated by 
foreign ownership, which accounts for around 
90% of total banking sector assets. Despite 
the large number of banks, the banking sector 
is fairly concentrated. The four largest banks 
claimed a market share of some 64% of total 
assets as at year-end 2007.
Financial deepening has continued rapidly 
in recent years. Total banking sector assets 
increased from 110% of GDP in 2005 to over 
120% as at end-2007 (see Table), a level which 
is among the highest in central, eastern and 
south-eastern Europe, but still well below the 
euro area average of almost 300%.
Banking sector assets are dominated by claims on 
the private sector,5 which reached 62% of total 
assets as at end-2007 (see Table 4). These claims 
grew considerably in 2005 and 2006 on the back 
of a revival in corporate lending and sustained 
strong growth of the retail segment. However, 
partly as a result of restrictive policy measures 
(described in Box 1), lending to the private sector, 
in particular to non-bank corporations, slowed 
signiﬁ  cantly in the course of 2007. 
The banking sector’s liability side continues 
to be dominated by deposits of domestic 
non-banks (61% of total liabilities as at 
end-2007). The solid private sector deposit 
growth in recent years was underpinned by the 
benign economic environment, healthy corporate 
ﬁ   nances, accelerating wage and employment 
growth, and banks’ efforts to mobilise domestic 
savings as a substitute for relatively expensive 
and administratively penalised foreign funding. 
In the data for Croatia, the private sector comprises households  5 
and enterprises, including public sector enterprises.
Table 3 Croatia: the structure of the banking sector
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
EBRD index of banking sector reform 3.3 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Number of banks (foreign-owned) 43 (24) 46 (23) 41 (19) 37 (15) 34 (14) 33 (15) 33 (16)
Number of banks per 100,000 inhabitants 1) 0.97 1.04 0.92 0.83 0.77 0.74 0.74
Assets of private banks 1) % of total assets 95.0 96.0 96.6 96.9 96.6 95.8 93.7
Assets foreign banks 1) % of total assets 89.3 90.2 91.0 91.3 91.3 90.8 89.2
Assets of 4 largest banks % of total assets 60.0 58.6 61.6 64.9 64.9 64.0 63.9
Herﬁ  ndahl-Hirschmann index 1), 2) 1,315 1,237 1,270 1,363 1,358 1,297 1,270
Sources: Croatian National Bank, EBRD and own calculations.
1) September 2007.
2) Sum of the squared asset shares of individual banks. The index ranges between 0 and 10,000. Below 1,000 it suggests a non-concentrated 
sector; 1,800 it is highly concentrated.13
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2   CROATIA
Reversing a falling trend that had been 
observed over ﬁ  ve years, the share of domestic 
non-bank deposits in total liabilities even 
increased signiﬁ  cantly in 2007 (see Table 5). 
At the same time, the need to ﬁ  nance domestic 
credit growth also caused banks’ external 
liabilities to grow strongly in absolute terms 
until 2006, while maintaining a fairly stable 
share of around 26% in total liabilities between 
2003 and 2006. In 2007, however, additional 
administrative CNB measures to contain credit 
growth led to a decrease of both the absolute 
level of foreign liabilities and their share in 
total liabilities to below 20% as at end-2007 and 
thus to an improvement of banks’ net foreign 
asset position.
Table 5 Croatia: liability structure of the banking sector
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Deposits of MFIs  % of total liabilities  0.1  0.1  0.6  0.4  2.3  2.6  3.7 
Deposits of domestic non-banks  % of total liabilities  73.2  68.7  63.7  60.4  59.2  59.0  61.3 
of which: 
Deposits of general government  % of total liabilities  4.9  5.1  4.0  4.2  4.5  4.4  5.0 
Deposits of households and enterprises  % of total liabilities  68.3  63.6  59.7  56.2  54.7  54.6  56.3 
Money market fund shares  % of total liabilities  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Debt securities issued  % of total liabilities  0.2  0.1  0.3  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.4 
Capital and reserves  % of total liabilities  17.9  15.9  14.0  12.7  12.8  13.6  15.8 
External liabilities  % of total liabilities  15.3  21.1  25.6  27.1  26.3  25.4  19.4 
Remaining liabilities  % of total liabilities  -6.7  -6.0  -4.3  -1.1  -1.0  -0.9  -0.5 
Memorandum items:   
Domestic  non-banks’  claim-to-deposit  ratio    90.7 104.6 106.6 108.4 117.4 119.2 115.5 
General  government’s  claim-to-deposit  ratio  304.2 273.8 293.5 242.6 266.4 227.2 185.2 
Households’ and enterprises’
claim-to-deposit  ratio  75.3 90.9 94.0 98.4  105.1  110.5  109.3 
Sources: Croatian National Bank and own calculations. 
Table 4 Croatia: asset structure of the banking sector
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Commercial bank assets % of GDP 86.1 91.4 98.4 104.9 110.4 119.4 122.3
Total domestic claims % of total assets 77.0 84.3 81.9 80.7 86.1 86.8 86.2
Claims on domestic MFI % of total assets 10.6 12.4 13.9 15.2 16.6 16.5 15.4
Claims on domestic non-banks % of total assets 66.4 71.9 67.9 65.5 69.5 70.2 70.8
of which:
Claims on general government % of total assets 15.0 14.1 11.8 10.1 12.0 10.0 9.2
Claims on domestic households and 
enterprises % of total assets 51.4 57.8 56.1 55.3 57.5 60.3 61.5
of which:
Claims on domestic enterprises % of total assets 30.3 31.8 27.9 26.4 26.7 28.3 28.0
Claims on domestic households % of total assets 21.1 26.0 28.2 28.9 30.8 32.0 33.6
Money market fund shares % of total assets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
External assets % of total assets 23.0 15.7 18.1 19.3 13.9 13.2 13.8
Claims on domestic households % of total claims on 
households and enterprises 41.1 45.0 50.2 52.3 53.5 53.0 54.6
Loans-to-claims ratio for domestic nonbanks 77.0 81.8 85.6 87.1 87.3 90.3 90.4
of which:
Loans-to-claims ratio for general government 19.7 29.1 37.6 39.9 42.8 48.9 46.3
Loans-to-claims ratio for domestic 
households and enterprises 93.7 94.7 95.7 95.7 96.6 97.1 97.0
Sources: Croatian National Bank and own calculations.14
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Growing operational efﬁ   ciency allowed the 
Croatian banking sector to maintain relatively 
high proﬁ  tability levels in recent years. Return 
on average assets (before tax) has sustained high 
levels above 1.5% for several years now 
(see Table 6). Return on average equity, 
however, declined gradually from a peak of 
16.1% in 2004 to 11.1% in 2007, mainly on the 
back of voluminous capital increases. Net 
interest income has continued to constitute the 
main source of revenue in the banking sector. 
Following a pick-up in interest rates in recent 
years, net interest income increased as a share of 
total operating income to slightly over 70% by 
2006. This trend was reversed in 2007, reﬂ  ecting 
declining interest rate spreads,6 a falling 
claim-to-deposit ratio owing to new CNB 
measures to rein in credit growth and the related 
change in banks’ strategies to push for other 
sources of income. 
Croatia’s non-bank ﬁ   nancial sector has 
developed very rapidly in recent years. By 
mid-2007, assets of the non-bank ﬁ  nancial 
sector accounted for well over one-fourth 
of total ﬁ   nancial sector assets and roughly 
one-third of GDP (see Table 7). The expansion 
of non-bank ﬁ  nancial institutions is remarkable 
as it occurred in parallel with the brisk expansion 
of the banking sector.
Interest rate spreads, measured as the average interest rate on  6 
loans minus the average interest rate on deposits, are higher than 
in the euro area but have been narrowing gradually since 2003 
despite rising interest rate levels, reﬂ  ecting a decline in inﬂ  ation, 
increasing operational efﬁ  ciency and stronger competition.
Table 6 Croatia: profitability of the banking sector
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total operating income % of total income 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
of which:
Net interest income % of total income 78.8 70.8 74.3 69.2 70.1 70.5 67.4
Net non-interest income % of total income 21.2 29.2 25.7 30.8 29.9 29.5 32.6
General administrative expenses % of total income 65.5 59.3 56.7 54.3 54.4 54.9 52.1
Loan loss provision expenses % of total income 13.7 6.6 7.7 6.6 5.3 6.2 7.4
Income tax % of total income 5.7 6.3 5.9 6.4 7.8 7.7 8.0
After-tax proﬁ  t/loss % of total income 15.1 27.8 29.4 32.6 32.5 31.1 32.5
Net interest income % of average assets 3.6 3.3 3.4 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.6
Net non-interest income % of average assets 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.3
Interest rate spread (total loans - total deposits) % 6.6 7.7 8.0 7.6 7.0 6.5 6.0
Return on average assets before tax % 0.9 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.6
Return on average equity % 6.6 13.7 14.5 16.1 15.1 12.4 11.1
Net interest margin % 3.6 3.3 3.4 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.6
Sources: Croatian National Bank and own calculations.
Table 7 Croatia: financial sector structure
(percentages)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  1)
Banks, consolidated assets (gross) 87.3 85.8 83.4 81.5 78.8 76.3 73.5
Open-end investment funds, net assets 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.6 2.7 4.1 6.2
Close-end investment funds, net assets 2.3 0.6 0.4 0.4 1.1 1.4 1.7
Insurance companies 5.9 5.7 5.4 5.2 5.1 5.0 5.1
Housing savings banks, consolidated assets (gross) 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.4
Compulsory pension funds, net assets 0.0 1.1 2.0 2.9 3.6 4.1 4.3
Voluntary pension funds, net assets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Savings and loan co-operatives 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Leasing companies 2.2 3.8 5.4 6.0 6.3 6.9 7.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Croatian National Bank, HANFA and Ministry of Finance.
1) June 2007.15
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2.3  RISKS AND SHOCK-ABSORBING CAPACITY
CREDIT RISK
Credit risk remains the main risk to ﬁ  nancial 
stability in Croatia. On the back of a booming 
economy and despite central bank actions to 
rein in bank lending, growth in credit to the 
private sector accelerated considerably in 2005 
and 2006 (see Table 9). A tightening of the 
central bank measures over the course of 2007, 
as described in Box 1, led to a deceleration of 
credit growth towards the end of 2007. This 
was driven mainly by a marked slowdown in 
corporate lending, as banks started to redirect 
corporate clients to direct borrowing from 
their parent banks abroad, enabling banks 
to continue to focus on the more proﬁ  table 
retail segment.
A recent study (Backé et al., 2007) showed 
that non-bank private sector credit levels in 
Croatia in 2006 were within equilibrium ranges 
suggested by underlying fundamentals. At the 
same time, credit levels have inched up in recent 
years, relative to the estimated equilibrium 
ranges, and by 2006 had moved above the 
mid-points of these ranges.
Credit expansion has been particularly brisk in 
the household sector. Household debt – which 
predominantly consists of bank loans – exceeded 
42% of GDP in June 2007 (see Table 8), which 
is still well below euro area levels (e.g. 67% 
in Germany), but clearly above levels in other 
countries in the region (e.g. 21% in Poland, 
29% in Hungary). Household debt levels even 
surpassed the level of annual gross disposable 
income by June 2007, which is high in 
comparison to central, eastern and south-eastern 
Europe (e.g. 41% in the Czech Republic). 
Implicit interest payments relative to gross 
disposable income increased to over 7% by June 
2007, driven by both strong volume growth and 
a pick-up in interest rates. The most dynamic 
line of business in the household segment is 
mortgage lending. Given strong demand for 
property and rising real estate prices since 2003 
(mainly in Zagreb and the coastal regions), loans 
for housing purposes have grown much faster 
than other types of household loans, with their 
Table 8 Croatia: selected macro-prudential indicators – domestic debt
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  1)
Households
Debt % of GDP 19.0 24.8 28.9 31.8 35.6 40.3 42.2
Debt % of gross disposable income 37.0 49.3 63.5 68.5 81.7 96.2 103.5
Debt %, y-o-y 29.7 42.5 27.9 19.2 20.2 22.6 22.4
Implicit interest payments % of gross disposable income 3.8 4.5 5.7 5.9 6.5 7.0 7.4
Non-ﬁ  nancial enterprises
Debt % of GDP 42.9 45.2 45.4 47.2 51.4 58.7 62.2
Debt % of corporate bank deposits 352.0 308.5 290.7 302.4 347.6 340.5 366.9
Debt %, y-o-y 8.5 15.2 10.0 12.6 17.2 23.5 24.5
Implicit interest payments % of GDP 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.4
Total non-ﬁ  nancial private sector
Debt % of GDP 61.9 70.0 74.4 79.1 87.0 98.9 104.4
Debt %, y-o-y 14.2 23.6 16.4 15.2 18.4 23.2 23.6
General government 
Debt % of GDP 42.3 42.1 43.3 45.9 46.9 44.0 43.2
Debt %, y-o-y 11.8 8.5 12.6 15.0 9.9 1.5 3.5
Interest paid % of GDP 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.0
Total non-ﬁ  nancial sector
Debt % of GDP 104.2 112.0 117.6 125.0 133.9 142.9 147.6
Debt %, y-o-y 13.2 17.4 15.0 15.1 15.3 15.6 17.0
Source: Croatian National Bank.
1) June 2007.16
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share in total household loans increasing from 
28% in 2002 to more than 40% as at end-2007.
Robust growth in the indebtedness of 
non-ﬁ   nancial enterprises contributed to 
increased credit risk also in the corporate 
sector. As a result of buoyant investment 
activity in a favourable economic environment, 
the corporate sector’s domestic debt growth 
(mainly bank loans) has accelerated 
signiﬁ  cantly in recent years, in 2006 not only 
reaching an all-time high, but also outpacing 
the growth rate of household debt for the ﬁ  rst 
time since the early 1990s. Consequently, 
total corporate sector domestic debt reached 
over 62% of GDP in June 2007, while interest 
payable gradually rose since 2004, reaching 
3.4% of GDP in June 2007.
Box 1
MEASURES BY THE CROATIAN NATIONAL BANK TO AVOID EXCESSIVE CREDIT GROWTH FUNDED BY 
EXTERNAL BORROWING
On account of concerns about risks associated with the rapid credit growth funded increasingly 
by bank borrowing from abroad and the related widening of external imbalances, the Croatian 
National Bank continued to curtail lending growth on several occasions in the last couple of 
years by introducing and ﬁ  ne-tuning new administrative measures (e.g. credit ceilings) and 
tightening reserve requirement regulations. In 2004, the CNB introduced an unremunerated 
marginal reserve requirement (MRR) on banks’ new foreign borrowing in addition to the overall 
reserve requirement. The MRR rate has been increased in several steps from 30% to 55% over the 
course of 2005 and 2006, and, to counter circumvention practices, the base has been broadened. 
As the rapid credit expansion continued to be funded to a large extent by external borrowing 
(mainly from parent banks), in 2006 the CNB extended reserve requirements by also introducing 
a special reserve requirement of 55% on the liabilities arising from securities issued by banks. In 
addition, as of the beginning of 2007 the CNB tightened monetary policy by introducing credit 
ceilings (12% p.a.) and penalising credit above the ceilings by obliging banks to purchase low-
yielding CNB bills on all lending in excess of the limits, with the rate of purchase initially set at 
50% of the loans granted in excess of the credit ceiling.
However, given signs of ongoing circumvention by banks (e.g. by shifting activities to their 
non-bank ﬁ  nancial subsidiaries), a ﬁ  ne-tuning of the measures became necessary later on in 
2007. One set of amendments came into force in June 2007 and included the division of the 
calculation base for purchasing compulsory CNB bills into two separate parts, i.e. household 
and corporate credit as well as off-balance-sheet items. In a second step, in July 2007 the CNB 
reduced banks’ maximum allowable credit growth (i.e. without triggering the compulsory 
purchase of CNB bills) to a monthly 0.5% for the second half of the year. As of October 2007 
the calculation base for the subscription of compulsory CNB bills was broadened by including 
also lending by legal persons that are controlled by Croatian banks. Finally, the rate of purchase 
of compulsory CNB bills was raised to 75% of the loans granted in excess of the limit as of 
January 2008.
All measures combined ﬁ  nally led to a deceleration of growth in credit to the private sector towards 
the end of 2007. However, at the same time there has been a rapid expansion of external foreign 
borrowing by non-ﬁ  nancial corporations, partly due to domestic banks encouraging their clients to 
borrow directly from their parent banks, and by non-bank ﬁ  nancial enterprises (see Section 5.3).17
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Croatia: overview of selected CNB measures to rein in lending growth
Monetary policy instrument Date Measure
Interest rates April 2000 Cutting the discount rate by 200 bps to 5.9%.
October 2002 Cutting the discount rate by 140 bps to 4.5%.
January 2008 Increasing the discount rate by 450 bps to 9.0%
Reserve requirements General reserve 
requirement
December 2000 Foreign currency reserve requirement lowered from 55% and uniﬁ  ed 
with the kuna reserve requirement at 23.5%.
July  2001 Reduction of the reserve requirement to 22%. Introduction of a 
uniﬁ   ed calculation base for kuna and foreign currency reserve 
requirements.
September 2001 10% of the accrued foreign currency reserve requirement have to be 
allocated in kuna.
October 2001 20% of the accrued foreign currency reserve requirement have to be 
allocated in kuna.
November 2001 Reduction of the reserve requirement to 19%. 25% of the accrued 
foreign currency reserve requirement have to be allocated in kuna.
August 2003 35% of the accrued foreign currency reserve requirement have to be 
allocated in kuna.
November 2003 40% of the accrued foreign currency reserve requirement have to be 
allocated in kuna.
December 2003 60% of the accrued foreign currency reserve requirement have to be 
allocated in kuna.
October 2004 Reduction of the reserve requirement to 18%.
January 2006 Reduction of the reserve requirement to 17%.
Marginal reserve 
requirement
August  2004 MRR introduced at 24% on borrowing larger than the base of 
June 2004.
February 2005 MRR increased to 30%.
May 2005  MRR increased to 40%.
January  2006 MRR increased to 55%. 40% of any increase in foreign debt 
compared to initial debt balance in June 2004 and 15% of increase 
after November 2005. Broader base including bank guarantees for 
corporate external borrowing and bank borrowing from domestic 
leasing companies. 55% with a view to off-balance sheet items 
(reference period November 2005).
July 2006 Additional widening of the scope of marginal reserve requirement on 
any increase in funds received from non-residents and legal persons 
in a special relationship with a bank which are used for ﬁ  nancing 
domestic legal and natural persons in the form of syndicated loans or 
for domestic banks’ placements to domestic legal and natural persons in 
the name and for the account of the mandator (mandated operations).
Special reserve 
requirement
March 2006 Introduction of a special reserve requirement (55%) to be allocated 
by banks on their liabilities arising from issued securities (calculation 
period January 2006). Separate calculation of the base is made for 
securities issued in kuna and those issued in foreign currency.
Administrative measures January 2003 Banks that showed loan growth above 16% (or 4% in a given quarter) in 
2003, relative to the balance of loans registered on 31 December 2002, 
were required to subscribe low-yield CNB bills in the amount equal to 
200% of the exceeded growth. Only in place in 2003.
December 2006 The CNB issued a decision towards the end of 2006 on the purchase 
of compulsory CNB bills, restricting the annual growth of bank 
placements in 2007 to 12%.
February 2007 Amendments to the Decision on the Purchase of Compulsory 
CNB Bills made it easier for banks to distribute the permissible rate 
throughout the ﬁ  nancial year: it will depend on a bank’s business and 
credit policy to determine in which part of the year the permissible
12 percent growth rate of placements will be utilised.
June  2007 Splitting up of the calculation base for purchasing compulsory 
CNB bills into two separate parts, i.e. household and corporate 
placements as well as off-balance sheet items, while keeping the 
annual 12% growth ceiling for both components.18
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The Croatian banking sector continued to 
be highly exposed to indirect credit risk 
stemming from foreign currency operations. 
The large share of bank loans denominated 
in or indexed to foreign currency (mainly 
the euro) exposes households and enterprises 
to exchange rate and foreign interest rate 
ﬂ   uctuations, producing credit risk for the 
banks (see Section 5.2). 
Loan quality, measured by the share of non-
performing placements 7 in total placements, 
continued to improve. In fact, the non-performing 
placement ratio declined further in recent years, 
According to the CNB Decision on the Classiﬁ  cation of Placements  7 
and Contingent Liabilities of Banks, placements encompass all 
ﬁ  nancial instruments which give rise to a bank’s exposure to credit 
risk, i.e. loans, ﬁ  nancial instruments held to maturity and debt 
instruments classiﬁ  ed into the available-for-sale portfolio.
Croatia: overview of selected CNB measures to rein in lending growth (Cont’d)
Monetary policy instrument Date Measure
July 2007 Reduction of banks’ placement growth to a monthly 0.5% for 
the second half of the year (reference period end-June 2006). 
October  2007 Broadening of the calculation base for the subscription of 
compulsory CNB bills by also including lending done by legal 
persons, controlled by a bank or an owner of a qualifying 
holding (who is a ﬁ   nancial institution) - reference period 
September 30, 2007.
January 2008 While keeping the annual 12% credit growth ceiling the rate 
of purchase of compulsory CNB bills has been increased from 
50% to 75% of the loans granted in excess of the credit ceiling. 
At the same time, the remuneration rate has been decreased 
from 0.75% p.a. to 0.25% p.a.
Loan loss classiﬁ  cation/
provisioning/risk weights
January 2004 Tightening of loan classiﬁ  cation and provisioning requirements. 
Until 2004 three loan classiﬁ  cation categories (fully recoverable 
placements (A, B), partly recoverable placements (C, D), 
irrecoverable placements (E)). From 2004 on following 
categories are in place: recoverable (A), partly recoverable (B1, 
B2, B3) and irrecoverable (C).
December 2005 Increase of capital adequacy risk weights by 25 bps on foreign 
currency or foreign currency-indexed loans to unhedged 
borrowers in the non-government sector.
June 2006 According to amendments to the Decision on the Classiﬁ  cation 
of Placements and Contingent Liabilities of Banks tighter 
speciﬁ  c reserve rates have to be applied.
January  2008 Introduction of higher capital requirements on banks whose 
growth rate of placements exceeds the maximum permissible 
growth rate of placements and the introduction of increased risk 
weights (100%) to placements with a currency clause extended 
to clients with no own foreign currency income.
Liquidity  ratios February  2003 Minimum ratio of foreign currency liquid assets to foreign 
currency liabilities of 35%.
February 2005 Liquid asset ratio cut to 32%.
March 2006 From 1 March to 31 October 2006, banks shall include in their 
liquid assets their participation in a EUR 400 million loan to 
the government.
October  2006 32% of foreign exchange liabilities must be covered by 
short-term foreign exchange assets with a maturity of less than 
3 months. Forex liabilities were expanded in order to include 
liabilities in kuna with a currency clause.
March 2008 In the period from 10 March 2008 to 31 May 2008, the banks 
shall include in their foreign currency claims as deﬁ  ned by 
this Decision, the amount with which they participate in the 
short-term foreign currency loan granted in March 2008 to 
the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia totalling 
EUR 200 million.
Sources: Croatian National Bank, IMF and own compilation.19
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reaching 3.2% as at end-2006, although this was 
primarily due to strong credit growth. The 
deceleration of credit growth in 2007 seems to 
have stopped this strong downward trend, with 
the non-performing placement ratio falling only 
marginally to 3.1% by the end of 2007.
With a view to improving credit risk management, 
a Central Credit Register (HROK) was established 
in Croatia in 2005. It was founded by 20 Croatian 
banks under the auspices of the Croatian Bank 
Association, became fully operational in May 
2007 (when banks started to use reports issued 
by HROK) and covers around 90% of the total 
retail market in Croatia. It collects, processes 
and exchanges data and information on the credit 
record of potential borrowers.
MARKET AND LIQUIDITY RISKS
Interest rate risk seems to be moderate. The 
assets of the banking sector have a limited 
exposure to interest rate ﬂ   uctuations as loan 
contracts, including ﬁ   xed interest rate loans, 
mostly carry a restrictive clause according to 
which the interest rate can be customised. At 
the same time, on the liability side, deposits are 
predominantly of a short-term nature. In this 
context, 60% of time deposits (accounting for 
some 70% of total deposits) have a maturity of 
less than one year, allowing for some ﬂ  exibility 
in times of high interest rate volatility. 
Consequently, most of the interest rate risk 
has been shifted to bank clients, and will thus 
materialise through the credit channel in the 
event of adverse developments.
Table 9 Croatia: selected banking sector stability indicators
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Credit risk
Credit growth %, y-o-y 23.2 33.6 16.8 13.1 20.3 22.7 13.3
Credit growth to the private sector %, y-o-y 24.7 31.6 15.9 13.6 18.5 23.7 14.5
Real credit growth to the private sector %, y-o-y 21.8 29.1 14.0 10.6 14.4 20.3 10.2
Credit growth to households %, y-o-y 29.3 43.0 27.7 18.7 20.3 21.8 18.0
Mortgage credit (housing loans) %, y-o-y 14.4 30.8 36.7 26.6 28.8 33.9 22.5
Non-performing placements % of total placements 7.3 5.9 5.1 4.6 4.0 3.2 3.1
Foreign currency credit % of total credit 84.7 79.8 74.2 75.7 77.4 70.9 61.0
Foreign currency deposits 1) % of total deposits 89.8 88.4 87.5 87.3 86.4 76.3 66.8
Market risk
Forex risk
Open foreign exchange position 3) % of total assets 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.7
Stock market risk
Ratio of shares and participations to 
total assets (equity holdings) 2.6 1.8 1.4 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7
Liquidity risk
Ratio of liquid assets 2) to total assets 37.3 29.4 32.8 31.2 28.0 27.5 27.6
Ratio of total loans to total deposits 63.2 74.2 76.7 80.7 88.5 92.5 92.8
Ratio of liquid assets 2) to short-term 
liabilities 126.7 97.0 117.2 120.4 103.1 102.6 107.6
Shock-absorbing factors
Loan loss provisions 4) % of non-performing 
placements 71.9 68.1 60.6 60.1 58.2 54.8 51.8
Capital adequacy ratio  18.5 17.2 16.2 15.3 14.7 14.0 15.4
Memorandum items:
Number of banks 
(foreign-owned) 43 (24) 46 (23) 41 (19) 37 (15) 34 (14) 33 (15) 33 (16)
Assets of foreign-owned banks 4) % of total assets 89.3 90.2 91.0 91.3 91.3 90.8 89.2
Sources: Croatian National Bank and own calculations.
1) Time deposits. 
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Given the low and declining fraction of shares 
and participations in total assets, the Croatian 
banking sector’s exposure to stock market risk 
is negligible. The falling trend of recent years, 
however, came to an end in 2007, with the ratio 
of equity holdings to total assets standing at 
0.7%, most likely given banks’ keen interest 
in the initial public offerings of major Croatian 
corporations in 2007.
Direct foreign exchange risk appears to be 
manageable. According to CNB regulations, 
total open foreign currency positions may not 
exceed 20% of banks’ regulatory capital. The 
ratio of the average long foreign exchange 
position to regulatory capital stood at 6.7% in 
June 2007 (2006: 5.2%), while the ratio for the 
short position was 2.8% (2006: 1.8%). These 
ﬁ  gures indicate a relatively low direct foreign 
exchange risk.
Liquidity risks have increased somewhat in 
recent years, as reﬂ  ected in slightly worsening 
liquidity indicators. Over the past few years the 
ratio of liquid assets to total assets declined 
gradually to 27.6% by end-2007, while at the 
same time the loan-to-deposit ratio rose to over 
90%. Nevertheless, liquidity levels can still be 
considered high, inter alia given the large 
amounts of free reserves held with the CNB 
(denominated mainly in foreign currency). 
However, the concentration of liquid assets 
within a few asset classes (e.g. Treasury bills) 
seems to indicate some risk in case of liquidity 
shocks. At the same time, given the high share 
of liabilities towards non-residents, risks 
associated with international ﬁ  nancing  have 
been growing in recent years. Despite the fact 
that parent banks appear to be the main external 
ﬁ  nancing source for foreign bank subsidiaries in 
Croatia 8 and that the year 2007 seems to have 
heralded a declining trend in foreign liabilities, 
the still high share of foreign liabilities requires 
cautious monitoring. 
SHOCK-ABSORBING FACTORS
Banking sector proﬁ  tability is relatively high, 
as mirrored by a fairly stable return on average 
assets of around 1.6% in recent years. This 
should provide banks with a comfortable buffer 
to weather unexpected and short-lived regional 
or sectoral shocks. Moreover, although return on 
average equity fell in recent years (see Table 6), 
this can be mainly attributed to the strengthening 
of banks’ capital bases, which should likewise 
underpin the shock resistance of the Croatian 
banking market.
Croatia’s banking sector is well capitalised 
according to standard capital ratios. 
Notwithstanding substantial capital increases, 
the capital adequacy ratio has fallen considerably 
since 2001 as a result of tighter capital adequacy 
regulations, reaching 14% of risk-weighted assets 
as at end-2006, which is however still well above 
the 10% required by Croatian law. Following 
large-scale capital increases, the capital adequacy 
ratio increased again to 15.4% in 2007. Thus, 
as banks’ capital ratios are far in excess of 
regulatory requirements, the banking sector has a 
substantial buffer in the event of shocks stemming 
from operational and market risks. However, 
according to the latest IMF sensitivity analysis,9 
adverse economic developments (mirrored by 
slowing real GDP growth and a pick-up in the 
unemployment rate) could have a large and 
negative impact on the capital of Croatian banks 
through the need for higher loan loss reserves.
Finally, widespread foreign ownership also 
bolsters banking system stability. Foreign 
bank presence in Croatia not only increases 
banks’ operational efﬁ   ciency by transferring 
capital, know-how and modern technologies, 
but also mitigates the likelihood of distress 
and sudden stops of capital ﬂ  ows given foreign 
banks’ strategic, long-term objective towards 
Croatia. Given reputational risks, foreign bank 
subsidiaries in Croatia may be able to draw on 
the backing of their parent banks in the event of 
unexpected shocks.10
It should be noted, however, that liquidity problems of parent  8 
banks in times of ﬁ   nancial market turbulence could have a 
negative impact on the reﬁ   nancing channels of foreign bank 
subsidiaries, thereby increasing external reﬁ  nancing risks. 
See Mitra (2007). 9 
However, it should be noted that in 2002 a foreign bank followed  10 
a hands-off approach with regard to its troubled Croatian 
subsidiary.21
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MACEDONIA
3.1  THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Real GDP growth has strengthened over the past 
few years, but remained below that of regional 
peers despite a marked acceleration in 2007. Real 
GDP growth reached 5% in 2007, higher than in the 
preceding years but still below the government’s 
medium-term forecasts in the range of 6%-6.5% 
(see Table 10). Structural unemployment remains 
signiﬁ  cant, with the ofﬁ  cial unemployment rate at 
35% at the end of 2007.
Since the mid-1990s, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia has anchored its exchange 
rate to the euro in the form of a soft peg. This policy 
is largely motivated by the signiﬁ  cant degree of 
openness (98% of GDP in 2006), close trade links 
with the EU (56% of total trade) and the high 
degree of unofﬁ  cial euroisation. Reﬂ  ecting strong 
capital inﬂ  ows, the National Bank of the Republic 
of Macedonia (NBRM) has been operating in 
an environment of a liquidity surplus in the 
banking system and has used its monetary policy 
instruments mainly for sterilisation purposes. 
Strong capital inﬂ  ows have been associated with 
a substantial decline in the interest rate on central 
bank bills, the main monetary policy instrument of 
the NBRM. Since the summer of 2007, this interest 
rate has hovered around 5%, down from 8.5% at 
the end of 2005. This trend reversed in 2008 when 
interest rates were raised and reached 6% in March 
due to increasing inﬂ  ationary pressures.
Monetary policy has managed to contain inﬂ  ation 
in past years, but pressures have surged over the 
most recent months. Inﬂ   ation has accelerated 
constantly since July 2007, reaching a multi-year 
high of 9.6% in year-on-year terms in February 
2008, on the back of rising energy and food 
prices, the latter also due to the severe drought 
in the summer. Nevertheless, average inﬂ  ation 
dropped to 2.3% in 2007, reﬂ  ecting the subdued 
price increases in the ﬁ  rst half of the year.
Fiscal policy has been generally prudent and has 
contributed to the sterilisation of liquidity by 
increasing government deposits held at the 
NBRM. For 2007 the government targeted a 
deﬁ   cit of 1%, but according to preliminary 
results actually registered a surplus of 0.6% of 
GDP, whereas for the medium term it committed 
itself to a deﬁ  cit of 1.5% in its agreement with 
the IMF. A major change in the ﬁ  scal setting 
was the introduction of a ﬂ  at tax on incomes and 
proﬁ   ts in 2007 at a rate of 12%, which was 
reduced to 10% in 2008. The adoption of a ﬂ  at 
tax regime is seen as a key measure to reduce 
the size of the informal sector, increase foreign 
direct investment and stimulate job creation. 
The stock of government debt is relatively low 
and has been declining in recent years, to about 
25% of GDP in 2007. In 2007 gross external 
debt increased to about €2.7 billion by the end 
of the year.11 
The NBRM substantially revised its external debt statistics at the  11 
end of 2007 due to a change in the compilation methodology.
Table 10 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: main macroeconomic indicators
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1)
Real GDP growth %, y-o-y 0.9 2.8 4.1 4.1 3.7 5.1
Inﬂ  ation %, y-o-y, period average 1.8 1.2 -0.4 0.5 3.2 2.3
Central bank bills rate  2) %, end of period 15.2 6.2 10.0 8.5 5.7 4.8
Nominal effective exchange rate Index (Q4 2001 = 100), end of period 103.7 107.5 110.9 111.4 110.7 110.9
Current account balance % of GDP -10.0 -3.6 -8.4 -2.7 -0.9 -2.3
FDI % of GDP 2.8 2.2 6.0 1.6 6.4 4.0
Gross external debt % of GDP … … 47.9 53.9 49.4 49.1
Central government balance % of GDP -5.7 -1.1 0.1 0.2 -0.6 0.6
Central government gross debt % of GDP 43.0 39.0 36.6 40.9 32.7 25.3
Sources: Haver Analytics, IMF, national sources and own calculations.
1) Mostly preliminary data.
2) Weighted average 28 day interest rate. 22
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Although the current account balance has 
improved considerably, the trade deﬁ  cit 
remains structurally large. The trade deﬁ  cit 
has been around 20% of GDP over the past 
years and widened even further in 2006 and 
2007. By contrast, the current account position 
has improved considerably, recording a deﬁ  cit 
of about 0.9% of GDP in 2006, on the back 
of improvements in the transfer, services and 
income balances. For 2007 a higher current 
account deﬁ   cit is estimated, but it is still 
well below regional averages. Foreign direct 
investment inﬂ   ows were generally low, at 
around 2% to 3% of GDP. However, these 
inﬂ  ows surged in 2006, owing to the foreign 
involvement in the privatisation of a large power 
distribution company, and remained quite strong 
in 2007 according to preliminary data.
3.2  THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: STRUCTURE AND 
DEVELOPMENTS
BANKING SYSTEM
The banking sector of the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia is highly concentrated, 
predominantly private, with private banks 
having an asset share above 98%, and largely 
in the hands of foreign owners. The banking 
sector has experienced some consolidation, 
with the number of banks declining from 
23 in 1999 to 19 in 2007 (see Table 11). In 
2007 ten banks were under dominant foreign 
ownership. In terms of asset shares, foreign 
penetration increased substantially in 2007 to 
83% of total assets, while in earlier years it 
was much lower than in the region as a whole. 
The concentration in the banking sector has 
experienced a signiﬁ  cant decline since 2003, 
but appears still quite high. The three largest 
banks owned almost two-thirds of total assets 
in 2007.
Institutional reforms in the banking system 
lag behind other countries in the region. 
The EBRD index of banking sector reform 
has remained unchanged in recent years at 
a relatively low level of 2.7, reﬂ  ecting  the 
lack of progress in this area. However, the 
regulatory framework changed in June 2007 
with the adoption of a new banking law, which 
is to a large extent compliant with the relevant 
EU directives. The most important changes in 
the new legislation are the strengthening of 
the banks’ corporate governance and of the 
eligibility criteria of shareholders, as well as 
a tightening of risk management and internal 
control requirements. 
Financial intermediation in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia has trended upwards 
since 2002, but remains at low levels. Measured 
by the share of total assets of the banking 
system in GDP, ﬁ  nancial intermediation stood 
at about 61% in 2007, up from 38% in 2002 
(see Table 12). Compared with the EU countries, 
only Romania has a lower level of ﬁ  nancial 
intermediation. Therefore, there is signiﬁ  cant 
potential for further ﬁ  nancial deepening via the 
banking system.
Banks’ assets are dominated by claims on 
households and enterprises. Among domestic 
Table 11 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: the structure of the banking sector
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1)
EBRD index of banking sector reform 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
Number of banks (foreign-owned) 23 (5) 22 (7) 21 (8) 20 (7) 21 (8) 21 (8) 20 (8) 19 (8) 19 (10)
Number of banks per 100000 inhabitants 1.16 0.96 0.97 1.04 0.92 0.83 0.77 0.83 0.92
Assets of private banks % of total assets 98.7 98.9 98.7 98.0 98.2 98.1 98.4 98.4 98.5
Assets of foreign banks % of total assets 12.8 53.4 51.1 44.0 47.0 47.3 51.3 53.2 82.9
Assets of 3 largest banks % of total assets 62.1 64.0 63.3 64.0 66.9 66.8 66.1 66.1 65.0
Herﬁ  ndahl-Hirschmann index  2) 1,863 1,865 1,738 1,667 1,842 1,685 1,607 1,595 1,527
Sources: EBRD and National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia.
1) September 2007.
2) Sum of the squared asset shares of individual banks. The index ranges between 0 and 10,000. Below 1,000 it suggests a non-concentrated 
sector; above 1,800 it is highly concentrated.23
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assets, claims on households and the non-bank 
corporate sector have been increasing, and 
accounted for 54% of total assets in 2007. 
Claims on enterprises are almost twice the size 
of claims on households, though this ratio has 
been declining due to the strong growth of credit 
to households since 2002. The share of external 
assets has declined constantly since 2002 and 
reached 17% in 2007 (see Table 12). 
The banking sector’s liabilities are dominated 
by domestic non-bank deposits, primarily from 
the household and corporate sectors. Domestic 
non-bank deposits increased to almost 70% of 
overall liabilities in 2007 (see Table 13). The 
bulk of this represents deposits of households 
and enterprises. The importance of capital 
and reserves declined to around 13% of total 
liabilities in 2007, while external liabilities 
have been playing a limited role in recent years, 
standing at 3% in 2007.
The favourable macroeconomic environment 
and intensifying banking activities contributed 
to an improvement in banking sector proﬁ  tability. 
In 2006 and 2007 banks recorded the highest 
proﬁ  ts since the country’s independence, with 
proﬁ  ts increasing by around 70% and 30% in 
2006 and 2007 respectively. The uptrend in both 
the return on average assets and the return on 
average equity since 2001, when both of them 
were negative, continued in 2007, when they 
reached 1.8% and 15.2% respectively at the end 
of the year (see Table 14).12
Banking proﬁ   ts primarily stem from regular 
operating income, while the share of extraordinary 
items registered a substantial decline. Net interest 
income played a dominant role in total income, 
The tables contain information only up to the third quarter of  12 
2007, as not all reported data were available for the full year by 
the cut-off date. However, where data are available for the full 
year, these ﬁ  gures are reported in the text.
Table 12 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: asset structure of the banking sector
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1)
Commercial bank (net) assets % of GDP 34.6 34.7 45.2 38.2 41.7 44.5 49.4 56.4 61.2
Total domestic claims % of total assets 62.6 59.7 51.8 56.4 57.1 59.1 63.2 67.5 73.2
Claims on domestic MFI % of total assets 7.8 10.2 11.0 6.3 9.0 7.6 11.1 10.7 12.6
Claims on domestic non-banks % of total assets 54.8 49.6 40.8 50.1 48.1 51.4 52.1 56.8 60.6
of which:
Claims on general 
government % of total assets 10.7 8.0 6.9 8.6 6.0 5.9 5.0 7.4 6.7
Claims on domestic 
households and enterprises % of total assets 44.1 41.6 33.9 41.5 42.1 45.5 47.1 49.4 54.0
of which:
Claims on domestic 
enterprises % of total assets 40.8 37.4 30.3 35.6 33.7 33.5 32.7 32.6 34.1
Claims on domestic 
households % of total assets 3.3 4.2 3.6 5.9 8.4 12.0 14.4 16.8 19.8
Money market fund shares % of total assets
External assets % of total assets 25.3 27.9 19.9 31.4 28.2 28.1 24.2 20.6 17.1
Claims on domestic 
households
% of total claims 
on households 
and enterprises 7.5 10.1 10.6 14.3 19.9 26.5 30.6 34.0 36.8
Loans-to-claims ratio for 
domestic nonbanks 71.2 77.6 78.6 79.8 81.8 86.1 86.8 85.1 86.9
of which:
Loans-to-claims ratio for 
general government 10.8 4.6 3.2 18.6 0.7 7.9 2.6 3.0 2.4
Loans-to-claims ratio for 
domestic households and 
enterprises 85.8 91.5 93.9 92.4 93.2 96.3 95.8 97.4 97.3
Sources: National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia and State Statistical Ofﬁ  ce.
1) September 2007.24
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Table 13 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: liability structure of the banking sector
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1)
Deposits of MFIs % of total liabilities 4.3 6.1 2.3 3.1 2.1 1.3 1.9 2.2 2.2
Deposits of domestic non-banks % of total liabilities 45.3 49.3 62.5 59.6 64.4 67.7 67.1 68.4 69.5
of which:
Deposits of general 
government % of total liabilities 4.5 6.1 3.4 2.6 2.1 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8
Deposits of households and 
enterprises % of total liabilities 40.8 43.2 59.1 57.0 62.3 66.3 65.8 67.4 68.7
Money market fund shares  % of total liabilities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Debt securities issued  % of total liabilities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.1
Capital and reserves % of total liabilities 20.7 23.3 18.1 20.7 19.1 17.0 15.9 13.3 12.6
External liabilities % of total liabilities 11.1 7.5 3.8 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.7 3.5 3.0
Remaining liabilities
(other liabilities and provisions 
for off-balance sheet liabilities) % of total liabilities 5.3 4.2 3.6 3.0 3.5 3.8 3.1 3.5 3.3
Remaining liabilities
(short-term borrowings up to 
1 year and issued debt securities) % of total liabilities 6.2 2.9 4.5 3.1 1.8 0.7 0.2 0.1 1.2
Remaining liabilities
(long-term borrowings over 
1 year) % of total liabilities 7.1 6.7 5.3 7.4 6.6 7.5 9.2 7.9 7.0
Memorandum items:
Domestic non-banks’ claim-to-
deposit ratio 138.2 113.9 70.7 91.6 81.3 83.1 83.8 88.3 92.4
General government’s claim-to-
deposit ratio 270.7 146.7 221.1 364.5 307.1 457.5 433.2 777.9 920.0
Households’ and enterprises’ 
claim-to-deposit ratio  123.5 109.2 62.1 79.3 73.6 75.0 77.2 78.0 83.2
Source: National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia.
1) September 2007.
Table 14 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: profitability of the banking sector
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1)
Total operating income % of total income 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
of which:
Net interest income % of total income 44.1 49.1 37.0 47.0 48.7 52.0 56.3 59.6 59.5
Net non-interest income % of total income 55.9 50.9 63.0 53.0 51.3 48.0 43.7 40.4 40.5
General administrative expenses % of total income 70.2 72.5 85.8 90.9 87.0 74.5 66.6 62.0 55.5
Loan loss provision expenses % of total income 87.6 58.8 48.6 30.9 39.8 34.7 28.6 15.5 19.9
Income tax % of total income 3.1 3.0 2.0 1.3 1.4 2.5 2.8 2.8 ...
After-tax proﬁ  t/loss % of total income 11.6 6.0 -13.2 6.4 7.6 8.1 17.9 26.7 ...
Net interest income % of average assets 3.5 3.5 2.1 2.8 2.9 3.5 3.9 4.0 3.9
Net non-interest income % of average assets 4.4 3.6 3.7 3.2 3.0 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.7
Interest rate spread 
(total loans - total deposits) %
Denar spread  2) % ... ... ... ... ... ... 6.9 6.5 4.9
Foreign exchange spread  2) % ... ... ... ... ... ... 6.5 6.7 6.6
Denar with foreign exchange 
clause spread  2) % ... ... ... ... ... ... 6.8 7.0 6.3
Return on average assets before tax % -0.9 0.4 -0.7 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.2 1.8 2.0
Return on average equity % -4.0 3.5 -3.2 2.0 2.3 3.1 7.5 12.3 15.8
Source: National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia.
1) September 2007.
2) 1999-2004 ﬁ  gures are not comparable due to a change in methodology.25
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with a share remaining at about 60% in 2007 
following an increasing path in the last ﬁ  ve years. 
Both interest income and interest expenditure 
rose markedly in 2006, owing to the increase 
in the volume of lending activity and to the 
growth of the deposit base and the government 
securities portfolio. On the expenditure side, 
staff expenses represented a stable and major 
expense item of non-interest expenditures. Net 
loan loss provisions increased to about 20% in 
2007, following a signiﬁ  cant decline in recent 
years due to the credit expansion, accompanied 
by an improvement in the risk proﬁ  le  of 
loan portfolios.
The positive trends in the basic income and 
expense categories of the income statement led 
to an improvement in banks’ proﬁ  tability and 
efﬁ   ciency indicators. Expenditure efﬁ  ciency 
improved, and the ratio of total regular income 
to non-interest expenditures increased markedly 
in 2006, recording its highest level in the past 
several years. In a European context, some 
indicators, such as the ratio of net interest 
income to total assets or the return on assets, are 
relatively high in the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia. This is mainly due to the lower 
level of assets, reﬂ  ecting  lower  ﬁ  nancial 
intermediation. The relatively low operating 
efﬁ  ciency of banks is however evident from the 
still large share of administrative expenditures 
in total operating income.
NON-BANK FINANCIAL SECTOR
While the ﬁ   nancial sector of the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continues to 
be dominated by the banking sector, accounting 
for 89% of total ﬁ  nancial sector assets in 2006,13 
the non-bank ﬁ  nancial sector has also registered 
strong growth in the past years. Insurance 
companies were the second most signiﬁ  cant 
segment in 2006 with an asset share of 7.5%, 
followed by leasing companies (1.4%) and 
savings houses (1.2%), while pension funds, 
pension fund management companies and 
brokerage houses combined accounted for only 
1% of total ﬁ  nancial sector assets. Pension funds 
were launched only in 2006,14 but their relevance 
is growing rapidly.
Like the banking sector, the non-bank ﬁ  nancial 
system is highly concentrated and largely 
foreign-owned. However, concentration 
decreased in most segments of the ﬁ  nancial 
sector in 2006. This downward trend is expected 
to continue with the further increase in foreign 
capital and gradual liberalisation of capital 
ﬂ   ows, which should intensify competition. 
Except for brokerage houses, all segments are 
dominantly under foreign ownership. In 2007 
several new foreign strategic investors entered 
the ﬁ  nancial market, leading to an increase in 
foreign ownership. Cross-sectoral ownership is 
at a relatively low level.
3.3  RISKS AND SHOCK-ABSORBING CAPACITY
CREDIT RISK
Credit risk is the dominant risk to ﬁ  nancial 
stability, given that the banks’ total credit 
exposure is increasing. Credit growth has 
accelerated markedly since 2003, reaching over 
40% in 2007 (see Table 15). This stems mostly 
from growth in credit to the private sector. 
Although households have a relatively low share 
in total credits (at around 35% in 2006), this 
share has been rising fast, as growth in credit to 
households exceeded the growth rate of other 
segments of private sector credit over the last 
seven years, standing at over 56% in 2007. Over 
the period 2000-2006, household borrowing 
increased almost eight-fold, dominated by 
consumer credits. In 2007 mortgage loans rose 
by around 60%, exceeding the rate of growth 
of total household credits, reﬂ  ecting inter alia 
improvements in the cadastre. Taking into 
account the low level of ﬁ  nancial intermediation 
and especially the low starting point for 
household lending, these developments are 
expected to continue.
Data on the overall ﬁ  nancial sector are currently available up to  13 
2006 only.
The pension reform started in 2002, establishing the legislative  14 
basis of pension funds. The ﬁ   rst pension fund management 
companies were launched in 2005. Pension funds of the fully 
funded second pillar of the pension system started operating in 
January 2006.26
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Credit risk increased not only due to the rising 
credit exposure, but also owing to the fact 
that most borrowers are new and do not have 
a credit history. In particular, most of the new 
borrowers of banks are households and small 
and medium-sized enterprises, making a risk 
assessment more difﬁ   cult. Households’ debt 
to banks and savings houses has risen at or 
above 40% annually since 2002 (see Table 16). 
This pace of expansion led to rapidly 
increasing ratios of household debt to GDP 
and to gross disposable income, which warrant 
further careful monitoring. For non-ﬁ  nancial 
enterprises, developments have been more 
mixed, as their debt has been rising relative 
to GDP since 2002, but the debt-to-corporate 
bank deposits ratio started to rise only in 2007 
after having fallen for about ﬁ  ve years. In an 
international comparison, these ratios do not 
seem to be extraordinarily high. 
Indirect credit risks gain relevance as the credit 
exposure with a foreign currency component 
rises. Foreign currency-indexed lending 
accelerated and registered the fastest growth 
in 2006 (about 55%), while despite some 
acceleration, the growth rate of denar credits 
remained the lowest (21%) (see Section 5.2). 
The quality of banks’ credit exposure has shown 
no signs of deterioration so far. The share of 
non-performing loans has declined since 2003 
and was around 9% of total loans in 2007 
(see Table 15). However, it has to be noted 
that a substantial amount of credit was written 
off by banks in 2006, whereby one bank was 
particularly involved as it wrote off 78% of the 
total amount, although these loans stem from 
years prior to the acceleration in credit growth. 
Banks’ off-balance-sheet exposure rose strongly 
in 2006, primarily owing to approved credit 
limits on payment cards, permitted negative 
Table 15 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: selected banking sector stability indicators
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1)
Credit risk
Credit growth %, y-o-y 8.3 8.6 6.2 9.0 8.4 23.7 20.1 30.9 41.3
Credit growth to the private sector %, y-o-y 22.0 20.1 7.6 10.4 15.6 26.8 23.4 31.0 42.1
Real credit growth to the private sector %, y-o-y 22.9 13.5 2.0 8.4 14.2 27.3 22.8 26.9 40.1
Credit growth to households %, y-o-y 14.7 42.6 7.5 47.5 59.5 63.2 40.8 42.9 56.4
Mortgage credit (housing loans) %, y-o-y ... ... ... ... ... 60.4 37.0 52.2 60.4
Non-performing loans % of total loans 20.1 26.9 24.7 13.6 23.4 19.3 16.1 11.8 9.5
Foreign currency credit % of total private sector 
credit 26.3 20.1 21.3 16.8 19.7 20.0 25.4 26.3 25.2
Foreign currency deposits % of total deposits 40.9 42.9 62.4 52.3 52.7 54.4 55.7 52.6 47.4
Market risk
Forex risk
Open foreign exchange position % of total assets ... ... 10.7 11.2 10.2 8.6 7.5 5.9 5.9
Stock market risk
Ratio of shares and participations 
to total assets (equity holdings) 2.1 1.7 1.2 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.7
Liquidity risk
Ratio of liquid assets  2) to total assets 20.5 16.7 31.9 14.1 12.9 12.1 14.9 17.7 18.5
Ratio of total loans to total deposits 83.7 78.8 54.7 67.0 64.4 69.7 70.3 71.7 77.1
Ratio of liquid assets  2) to short-term 
liabilities 36.4 28.8 48.2 23.2 19.8 17.8 22.0 25.6 26.4
Shock-absorbing factors
Loan loss provisions % of non-performing loans 142.9 112.7 95.4 90.4 91.4 102.7 110.8 113.6 121.1
Capital adequacy ratio 28.7 36.7 34.3 28.1 25.8 23.0 21.3 18.3 17.2
Memorandum items:
Number of banks (foreign-owned) 23 (5) 22 (7) 21 (8) 20 (7) 21 (8) 21 (8) 20 (8) 19 (8) 19 (10)
Assets of foreign-owned banks % of total assets 12.8 53.4 51.1 44.0 47.0 47.3 51.3 53.2 82.9
Source: National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia.
1) September 2007.
2) Liquid assets = cash in vaults + deposits with the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia + central bank bills + treasury bills.27
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balances on current accounts and uncovered 
letters of guarantee and letters of credit.
While the substantial credit expansion 
necessarily leads to enhanced credit risks, 
stress tests conducted by the NBRM suggest 
that there is still scope for a further signiﬁ  cant 
rise in lending. These tests indicate that gross 
credits could increase by about 60% without 
jeopardising banks’ solvency as measured 
by the capital adequacy ratio. At the same 
time, certain measures of the credit portfolio 
quality, such as non-performing loan ratios, are 
a lagging indicator of emerging risks and may 
be biased downwards in credit booms, since 
non-performing loans generally appear and 
increase as the credit portfolio matures. 
Similarly, a slowdown in lending activity may 
lead to a rise in non-performing loan ratios.
MARKET AND LIQUIDITY RISKS
Market risk is more limited than credit risk, but 
still requires careful monitoring. Given that most 
bank loans are extended with de facto variable 
interest rates, interest rate risk is limited in the 
banks’ balance sheets. That said, as exposure 
Table 16 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: selected macro-prudential 
indicators – domestic debt
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1)
Households
to banks and savings houses
Debt % of GDP 1.4 1.8 1.9 2.7 4.1 6.2 8.1 10.6 13.5
Debt % of gross disposable income 2.5 3.2 3.7 5.7 9.4 13.6 17.5 23.4 ...
Debt %, y-o-y 9.1 43.6 7.9 44.6 58.1 59.8 39.6 41.5 39.0
Implicit interest payments % of gross disposable income 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.5 2.1 2.5 ...
+ to leasing companies
Debt % of GDP ... ... ... ... ... 6.7 8.8 11.6 ...
Debt % of gross disposable income ... ... ... ... ... 14.6 18.8 ... ...
Debt %, y-o-y ... ... ... ... ... ... 40.7 41.3 ...
Non-ﬁ  nancial enterprises
to banks and savings houses
Debt % of GDP 14.6 13.9 14.1 13.2 14.3 15.7 16.5 19.1 21.5
Debt % of corporate bank deposits 126.0 134.3 182.0 173.8 143.9 135.3 137.7 129.3 140.5
Debt %, y-o-y -1.2 7.6 0.6 -2.2 11.2 16.0 13.8 24.8 23.1
Implicit interest payments % of GDP 2.6 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.1
+ to leasing companies
Debt % of GDP ... ... ... ... ... 16.1 17.2 20.2 ...
Debt % of corporate bank deposits ... ... ... ... ... 138.6 142.4 134.2 ...
Debt %, y-o-y ... ... ... ... ... ... 14.9 25.3 ...
Total non-ﬁ  nancial private sector
to banks and savings houses
Debt % of GDP 16.0 15.6 16.0 15.9 18.4 21.9 24.6 29.7 35.0
Debt %, y-o-y -0.3 10.7 1.4 3.5 19.1 25.8 21.1 30.3 28.8
+ to leasing companies
Debt % of GDP ... ... ... ... ... 22.7 26.0 31.8 ...
Debt %, y-o-y ... ... ... ... ... ... 22.5 30.7 ...
Central government 2)
Debt % of GDP 2.3 18.3 17.8 15.7 14.5 13.6 13.0 12.8 10.0
Debt %, y-o-y ... 793.2 -4.0 -7.8 -5.0 -0.6 2.1 7.4 -14.7
Interest paid % of GDP 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Total non-ﬁ  nancial sector
Debt % of GDP 18.3 33.9 33.8 31.6 32.9 35.6 37.5 42.6 45.0
Debt %, y-o-y ... 109.9 -1.5 -2.5 7.2 14.2 13.8 22.4 15.6
Memorandum items:
Total external debt % of GDP … … … … … 47.9 53.9 49.4 43.6
Total private external debt % of GDP … … … … … 20.1 22.2 24.4 24.8
Sources: National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, Ministry of Finance and State Statistical Ofﬁ  ce.
1) September 2007.
2) Total domestic public debt of the central government.28
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to interest rate ﬂ  uctuations is largely passed on 
to the borrowers, this represents an additional 
source of indirect credit risk.
Banks are exposed to foreign exchange risk due 
to the relatively large open foreign exchange 
position in the banks’ balance sheets. Although 
the open foreign exchange position of banks 
has declined since 2002, it was still positive 
and relatively high at almost 6% of total assets 
in 2007 (see Table 15). This might be related 
to the peg of the denar, which may lead to a 
sub-optimal perception of potential exchange 
rate risk also on the part of banks. Both foreign 
currency assets and liabilities rose by over 
20% in 2006 due to the increase in foreign 
currency-indexed credits and deposits. The share 
of foreign currency assets in total exceeded 
that of foreign currency liabilities, while both 
shares were above 50%. Therefore, while 
clients would be adversely affected by a denar 
depreciation, banks’ balance sheets would be hit 
by an appreciation, partly balancing the foreign 
exchange risk borne by borrowers.
Banks’ exposure to equity price risk is limited, 
as the ratio of shares and participations to total 
assets has declined since 2002 to well below 1% 
in 2007. These small positions are not likely to 
result in substantial vulnerabilities for banks.
Liquidity risk has been on the decline in recent 
years. The ratio of liquid assets to total assets 
and to short-term liabilities has been rising in the 
last three years, pointing to an improved liquidity 
situation (see Table 15). At the same time, the ratio 
of total loans to total deposits increased. While 
this could prima facie point to greater liquidity 
risks in the banking sector, it actually reﬂ  ects an 
acceleration of lending activity in an environment 
where the system as a whole has been relatively 
liquid. Moreover, the maturity of the banks’ 
deposit base rose, primarily due to the faster 
growth of time deposits than of sight deposits. 
SHOCK-ABSORBING FACTORS
The increase in banks’ proﬁ  tability  is 
encouraging and provides a natural buffer 
against shocks. In this respect, the last two years 
were very successful as bank proﬁ  ts  reached 
record highs (see Table 14). However, there 
is still further scope for improving efﬁ  ciency 
and reducing overhead costs. The coverage of 
non-performing loans by loan loss provisions 
has increased steadily since 2002 and is at a 
relatively high level (see Table 15).
In recent years the banks’ capital adequacy ratio 
has trended steadily downwards, particularly 
owing to the banks’ increased level of activity 
and changing structure. Although the level of 
guarantee capital rose, risk-weighted assets 
registered a much faster growth rate. This is due 
to increased activities and also to the change in 
their structure. Lending activity (with a 100% 
weight) and off-balance-sheet activities increased 
relative to e.g. accounts with other banks (with a 
weight of 20%). In addition, items with a 100% 
weight have a larger share among off-balance-
sheet risk-weighted assets, given the acceleration 
of banks’ activity related to issuing credit cards.
At the end of 2007, the capital adequacy ratio of 
the banking system (17%) was still comfortably 
above the required level (8%). Furthermore, none 
of the banks had a capital adequacy ratio below 
the minimum. Nevertheless, the ratio dropped 
by about four percentage points compared with 
2005, rising only in the group of small banks, 
which reﬂ  ects their continuing marginalisation 
in ﬁ  nancial intermediation. Banks mainly rely 
on capital injections by their parent entities or 
on internal sources, such as retained earnings. 
Financing through equity issuance is of very 
limited relevance. 
According to the results of regular stress tests 
based on different shock scenarios, the banking 
system of the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia is adequately solvent. The NBRM 
started to conduct regular quarterly stress tests in 
2004. Recently, there has been a tendency towards 
continuous improvement in the results. Overall, 
the quarterly tests suggest that the banking 
system is more resilient to liquidity risk than to 
credit risk. Therefore, banks’ solvency is most 
negatively affected – although still maintained – 
if certain scenarios for credit risk are simulated.29
ECB
Occasional Paper No 95
September 2008
3   THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC 
OF MACEDONIA
The banking sector was found to be relatively 
stable also when considering scenarios featuring 
two or more shocks. In the most extreme of the 
reported scenarios, including a combination of 
all shocks of credit, interest rate and exchange 
rate risks (50% increase in the credit exposure 
in the C, D and E risk categories,15 5 percentage 
points increase in domestic interest rates and 
a 20% depreciation of the denar relative to the 
euro and the dollar), the capital adequacy ratio – 
ceteris paribus – would drop to about 16%, still 
double the minimum required level.
The NBRM strengthened several regulatory 
requirements and aimed at improving its 
supervisory practices. In early 2006, the NBRM 
adopted a Supervision Development Plan in 
order to facilitate the transition to risk-based 
supervision, which was ofﬁ  cially introduced in 
early 2008. In early 2008, the NBRM also 
strengthened prudential regulations with the 
aim of containing credit expansion, in response 
to concerns about rapid growth of consumer 
loans to households (about three-quarters of 
which related to overdrafts on credit cards) and 
lending indexed to foreign currency. While the 
latter is generally collateralised, credit card 
loans are typically not secured. Therefore, the 
NBRM decided to increase the risk weight of 
such assets in the capital adequacy 
computation.16 The NBRM is also working on 
improving its credit register. 
A major achievement was the establishment 
of an inter-institutional ﬁ  nancial  stability 
authority at the end of 2006, which consists 
of all supervisory and regulatory bodies 
in the country, with the aim of monitoring 
developments in each segment of the ﬁ  nancial 
system on an informal and expert basis. As 
for the cooperation with foreign supervisory 
authorities, memoranda of understanding were 
signed with two additional countries (Greece 
and Montenegro) at the beginning of 2007, thus 
increasing the number of signed memoranda to 
six (previous memoranda have been signed with 
Albania, Bulgaria, Russia and Slovenia). 
These categories represent the highest credit risk. 15 
In addition, banks have to maintain an internal information  16 
system on the indirect credit risk related to the open foreign 
exchange position of clients and carry out stress tests annually.30
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4.1  THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
The Turkish economy recorded strong but 
decelerating growth in 2006 and 2007. Real 
GDP growth declined to less than 5% in 2007, 
after having posted a robust average annual 
rate of more than 7% in the previous ﬁ  ve 
years. The rate of growth of private investment 
sharply decelerated during 2007 as a result of 
monetary policy tightening in the aftermath 
of the spring 2006 ﬁ  nancial turbulence and on 
the back of political uncertainty surrounding 
the parliamentary and presidential elections 
in 2007. The pace of economic expansion was 
mainly supported by pre-electoral government 
spending and private consumption. Net export 
growth provided a negative contribution to 
growth due to an acceleration in the growth of 
imports.
The disinﬂ   ationary process resumed in the 
course of 2007 after a setback in the previous 
year due to ﬁ   nancial turbulence and the 
depreciation of the Turkish lira. The average 
inﬂ   ation rate declined to 8.8% in 2007 from 
9.6% in 2006. The central bank maintained a 
tightening bias until the uncertainty surrounding 
the presidential elections eventually dissipated 
and started to ease the monetary policy from 
September 2007 onwards. The downward trend 
in the average inﬂ  ation rate masks, however, a 
number of external and domestic shocks that 
contributed to a moderate acceleration in the 
rate of growth of the CPI towards the end of 
2007. In particular, high energy prices and 
global food prices contributed to bringing the 
end-year headline inﬂ  ation to 8.4%, more than 
two percentage points above the upper limit set 
by the central bank (6%).17 These external 
shocks were compounded by domestic factors, 
namely the drought that led to a decline in 2007 
agricultural output, supporting food price 
inﬂ  ation and the increase in the administered 
prices of water and tobacco. In spite of these 
shocks, the central bank maintained a medium-
term inﬂ  ation target of 4% for 2008.
The external accounts remain a source of 
macroeconomic vulnerability for the Turkish 
economy. The trade and current account deﬁ  cits 
stayed large in 2007, at around 7% of GDP 
and 5.5% of GDP respectively, marginally 
improving compared with the previous year. 
Indeed, in US dollar terms, exports growth 
outpaced imports growth, leading to a narrowing 
of the trade deﬁ  cit as a share of GDP in spite 
of high energy prices and the appreciation of 
the Turkish lira. As in the previous two years, 
the net inﬂ  ow of foreign direct investment was 
robust – around 3% of GDP – ﬁ  nancing about 
half of the current account deﬁ  cit. Other private 
capital  ﬂ   ows, to a large extent medium to 
long-term loans, contributed to a smooth 
ﬁ  nancing of the current account deﬁ  cit and a 
continued accumulation of net international 
In 2006 the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey introduced  17 
an inﬂ  ation-targeting regime. The inﬂ  ation target for end-2007 
was set at 4%, with an uncertainty band of +/-2%.
Table 17 Turkey: main macroeconomic indicators
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Real GDP growth %  6.2 5.3 9.4 8.4 6.9 4.8 1)
CPI Inﬂ  ation (period average) %  45.1 25.3 8.6 8.2 9.6 8.8
Interbank Overnight rate (eop) %  44.0 26.0 18.0 13.5 17.5 15.8
Sovereign spread bps 696.0 309.0 264.0 223.0 207.0 239.0
Nominal effective exchange rate (2001 =100) 133.7 151.2 154.7 147.5 158.1 153.9
Current account balance % of GDP -0.7 -2.6 -4.0 -4.7 -6.0 -5.5 1)
FDI % of GDP 0.5 0.6 0.7 2.0 3.8 3.8 1)
Gross external debt (eop) % of GDP 56.0 47.0 41.0 34.9 39.0 34.2 1)
General government balance % of GDP -14.7 -6.9 -3.1 0.6 0.2 -0.6 1)
General government gross debt % of GDP 73.3 65.3 59.3 53.7 47.9 41.8 1)
Sources: Haver Analytics, IMF, national sources and ECB staff calculations.
1) Estimates.31
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reserves, which reached USD 71 billion – almost 
ﬁ  ve months of imports of goods and services – 
by the end of 2007. The gross external debt 
declined by ﬁ  ve percentage points to 34% of 
GDP in 2007.
The ﬁ  scal position deteriorated in the course 
of 2007, as public spending rose in the run-up 
to the round of elections during the summer 
and as tax collection weakened. The general 
government budget is estimated to have 
returned to a deﬁ  cit of around 0.6% of GDP 
at the end of 2007, as a consequence of the 
worsening in the primary balance, in turn due to 
low revenue collection and rising expenditures. 
Notwithstanding the worsening public deﬁ  cit, 
the gross government debt continued to 
decline as a share of GDP to around 42% in 
2007. In addition, the Turkish Treasury has 
been successful in increasing the average 
maturity of domestic debt: by November 2007, 
the weighted average maturity of domestic 
borrowing had increased to 35 months for the 
period from January to November, up from 
28 months for 2006 as a whole. Still more than 
half of the public debt is sensitive to exchange 
rate or interest rate risk.
4.2  THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: STRUCTURE 
AND DEVELOPMENTS
The Turkish banking sector has gone through a 
major transformation process in the aftermath of 
the ﬁ  nancial crises of 2000 and 2001. Liquidations 
and mergers and acquisitions substantially 
reduced the number of banks from 81 at the end 
of 1999 to 46 at the end of 2007.18 The 
transformation process has led to an increasing 
concentration in the banking sector, as the ﬁ  ve 
largest banks accounted for 61% of total banking 
sector assets in 2006, up from 48% in 2000. State-
owned banks continue to play a signiﬁ  cant but 
declining role, accounting for around 30% of 
total banking sector assets as at end-2006. 
The total size of the banking sector, measured by 
banks’ assets, stood at 87% of GDP at the end of 
2006, slightly up from 84% at the end of 2005. 
This remains very low in comparison with the euro 
area, where banking sector assets represent almost 
300% of GDP. Transaction taxes, including the 
This partly reﬂ  ects the actions of the Savings Deposit Insurance  18 
Fund (SDIF), which took over 21 banks that had become a risk 
for banking system stability. Of these 21 banks, 20 have been 
merged, sold or liquidated.
Table 18 Turkey: the structure of the banking sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1)
Number of institutions Share of total loans (percentages)
State-owned commercial banks 333333 16.6 18.2 20.9 20.6 21.6 22.1
Privately-owned commercial 
banks 20 18 18 17 14 12 65.3 67.1 67.4 67.5 58.6 57.9
Foreign-owned commercial 
banks 15 13 13 13 15 17 4.0 4.0 4.6 6.8 15.3 15.7
SDIF banks 221111 3 . 4 1 . 3 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0
Non-depository banks 14 14 13 13 13 13 10.8 9.4 7.0 5.0 4.5 4.3
Total 54 50 48 47 46 46 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Share of total assets (percentages) Share of total deposits (percentages)
State-owned commercial banks 31.9 33.3 34.9 31.4 29.6 29.5 34.3 37.5 41.8 37.7 35.7 36.6
Privately-owned commercial 
banks 56.2 57.0 57.4 59.7 54.8 54.3 58.5 57.3 55.0 57.4 52.3 51.8
Foreign-owned commercial 
banks 3.1 2.8 3.4 5.2 12.2 12.6 2.4 2.2 3.1 4.8 12.0 11.6
SDIF banks 4.4 2.9 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.0 4.8 3.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Non-depository banks 4.4 4.1 3.7 3.2 3.2 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Banks Association of Turkey.
1) September 2007.32
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Banking Transaction and Insurance Tax, continue 
to hamper domestic intermediation. These 
transaction taxes, together with foreign currency 
lending restrictions, explain why a signiﬁ  cant 
portion of lending continues to be channelled 
through Turkish banks’ offshore branches.
The asset structure of the banking sector has 
changed signiﬁ  cantly since the 2000 and 2001 
crises. Increased macroeconomic stability, 
more stable sources of funding and easier 
access to working capital have contributed to 
a gradual restructuring of the asset structure. 
One main element of change has been a shift 
towards core banking activities, resulting in 
high credit growth between 2003 and 2006. 
Consequently, the share of loans in total assets 
increased from 27% at the end of 2001 to 49% 
by September 2007 (see Table 19). Government 
securities, which used to dominate the asset side 
of the banking sector, were overtaken by loans 
as an asset class in banks’ books during 2005.
Table 19 Turkey: asset structure of the banking sector
(percentage of total assets)
Turkish banking sector State-owned banks Privately-owned banks
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1)
Cash and central 
bank balances
2.1 2.0 2.5 3.8 7.7 6.6 1.7 1.9 2.0 3.7 7.3 6.0 2.7 2.3 3.1 4.3 8.5 7.4
Due from banks 5.6 4.9 5.8 5.9 7.2 5.0 5.1 5.8 5.6 4.6 5.7 3.5 5.5 4.1 5.0 5.5 5.6 4.7
Securities 44.5 46.4 41.8 38.6 35.0 34.4 59.7 62.3 60.6 56.9 51.1 51.0 37.7 38.5 32.7 31.6 31.8 29.6
Loans 26.5 28.0 33.7 38.6 45.0 48.9 13.8 15.3 20.1 25.3 32.8 36.5 30.8 33.0 39.6 43.6 48.1 52.1




4.5 4.1 3.4 2.3 1.7 1.5 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.0 1.5 1.4 5.7 5.2 4.2 2.6 1.9 1.7
Subsidiaries (net) 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 1.6 1.7 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.5 2.4 2.4
Investment and 
associates
1.4 1.0 1.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.7 1.5 2.0 0.5 0.3 0.3
Other 12.9 11.1 9.2 8.1 1.6 1.7 15.4 11.0 8.5 6.7 1.0 0.9 12.2 11.6 9.7 8.4 1.4 1.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Banks Association of Turkey.
1) September 2007.
Table 20 Turkey: liability structure of the banking sector
(percentage of total liabilities)
Turkish banking sector State-owned banks Privately-owned banks
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1)
Deposits 67.0 64.4 64.4 63.9 64.5 63.6 72.1 72.6 77.1 76.8 77.9 78.8 69.7 64.7 61.7 61.4 61.6 60.6
Due from banks 12.7 13.6 13.1 15.5 17.1 16.0 7.9 5.5 4.8 3.7 6.2 6.0 13.0 15.9 17.0 20.7 21.9 19.7
Shareholders’ 
equity 12.1 14.2 15.0 13.5 12.0 13.2 9.9 11.5 9.4 10.6 10.4 9.9 12.7 14.7 15.6 12.4 10.4 12.4
Other liabilities 8.2 7.8 7.5 7.1 6.4 7.2 10.1 10.4 8.7 8.9 5.5 5.3 4.6 4.7 5.7 5.5 6.1 7.3
of which:
Miscellaneous 
payables 1.1 1.2 1.7 1.5 1.9 2.1 0.5 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.8 1.5 2.2 2.3
Funds 1.7 1.9 1.6 1.4 0.9 0.8 5.1 5.3 4.3 4.2 2.8 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Provisons 1.6 1.7 1.6 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.6 2.0 1.7 2.3 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.8 1.7 1.7
Other 
external 
resources 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.5 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.8 1.2
Other 2.5 1.8 1.4 0.6 1.3 1.8 2.2 1.5 1.3 1.0 0.6 0.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 2.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Banks Association of Turkey.
1) September 2007. 33
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The liability structure of the banking sector has 
also undergone signiﬁ  cant changes over the past 
few years. Following the banking restructuring 
process, increased conﬁ   dence in the banking 
sector has led to an overall rise in the volume 
of deposits in absolute terms. In relative 
terms, between 2004 and September 2007, 
the share of deposits in total liabilities of the 
state-owned banks increased to 79%, while 
that of the privately-owned banks remained 
relatively stable at 61% (see Table 20). 
Following the 2000 and 2001 crises, the 
banking sector has become proﬁ  table  again 
since 2002, with return on equity and return 
on assets standing at 16.5% and 2.2% for the 
banking sector as a whole in September 2007 
(see Table 21). Proﬁ  tability has been helped by 
the maturity structure of the banking sector’s 
assets and liabilities. As short-term deposits 
(0-3 months) are the main source of funding, 
the average maturity of interest rate-sensitive 
liabilities is shorter than that of interest rate-
sensitive assets. Consequently, any decrease 
in interest rates has a positive effect on the 
sector’s proﬁ  tability. In addition, as conﬁ  dence 
increased, the average maturity of assets started 
lengthening. Hence, the gap between the average 
maturity of interest rate-sensitive liabilities and 
the average maturity of interest rate-sensitive 
assets became larger. 
The non-bank ﬁ  nancial sector is growing rapidly 
but remains relatively small at around 13% of 
total ﬁ  nancial sector assets. Insurance companies 
made up 3.2% of total ﬁ   nancial sector assets, 
but are mostly linked to banks in order to create 
synergies. Other institutions that have experienced 
rapid growth are the pension companies launched 
in 2003. Financial markets are largely dominated 
by government debt securities. Public debt has 
declined but remains relatively high. Banks are 
the most important investors in government debt 
and seem to prefer shorter-duration instruments.
4.3  RISKS AND SHOCK-ABSORBING CAPACITY
CREDIT RISK
In line with the shift to core banking activities, 
credit risk linked to the private sector has risen. 
The growing importance of loans has added 
another dimension to the credit risk borne by the 
banking sector, which was traditionally overly 
dependent on government securities for revenue 
generation. Credit demand stems mainly from 
large corporations and small and medium-sized 
enterprises (62% of total loans at the end of 2007) 
and secondly from consumers (34%). Consumer 
lending used to be marginal and only since 2003 
has it picked up substantially, with year-on-year 
growth ﬁ  gures of 99% (2003), 111% (2004) and 
71% (2005). Despite the fact that retail credit 
growth has slowed down since June 2006 due to 
Table 21 Turkey: profitability of the banking sector
(percentages)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  1)
Total operating income 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
of which:
Net interest income 76.9 158.3 64.3 48.1 67.2 64.2 63.5 63.1
Net fees and commissions income 15.1 14.8 11.1 11.5 15.1 17.4 19.3 19.5
Net trading income -29.4 -90.1 4.5 28.5 8.8 7.4 0.0 2.3
Other operating income 37.4 17.0 20.1 12.0 9.0 11.1 17.2 15.1
Total operating income 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
of which:
Provisions for NPLs and other receivables 25.0 76.7 24.7 14.6 14.0 18.1 11.7 10.0
Personnel expenses 36.5 n.a. 18.0 17.1 17.7 18.6 19.4 19.3
Other operating expenses 80.0 72.1 30.8 28.5 24.2 32.8 25.6 22.8
= Total operating expenses 141.4 148.8 73.5 60.1 55.8 69.5 56.7 52.1
Return on assets -3.0 -5.7 1.1 2.2 2.1 1.4 2.3 2.2
Return on equity -62.4 -58.4 9.2 15.8 14.0 10.6 18.9 16.5
Source: Banks Association of Turkey.
1) September 2007.34
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increasing interest rates (see also the section on 
market and liquidity risk), it remains relatively 
rapid (48% in 2006 and 38% in 2007), with banks 
vying for market share in a highly competitive 
environment.
The rapid increase in consumer lending raises 
questions about the quality of the loan portfolio. 
Credit cards have accounted for a substantial 
part of retail lending. This is not surprising given 
the aggressive marketing of credit cards over the 
past few years. However, since 2005, the credit 
card segment seems to have started to become 
saturated, resulting in slowing growth rates from 
109% during 2004 to 25% in 2006 and 2007.
New areas of lending, such as mortgages, are seeing 
fast growth, with growth rates of around 203% 
in 2004 and 368% in 2005. Despite a slowdown 
after June 2006 due to increasing interest rates, 
year-on-year growth still stood at 79% in 2006 
and 40% in 2007. With the rapid decline in 
inﬂ  ation and decreasing interest rates until June 
2006, mortgage lending had become increasingly 
attractive. Indeed, the Turkish mortgage market 
is still very small, and represented only 3.8% of 
GDP in 2006 (up from 0.2% in 2003) and 4.2% 
by June 2007, which is very low by European 
standards and indicates considerable scope for 
growth. The share of mortgage loans in total retail 
loans increased further to 33% by the end of 2007 
from 7% at the end of 2002. In response to these 
developments, a new law on mortgage lending has 
been introduced, allowing banks to apply ﬂ  oating 
rates to mortgages, charge prepayment penalties 
and securitise loans.
High credit growth rates as such may not 
represent a problem, as they can reﬂ  ect – as is 
the case in Turkey – a “natural” development due 
to a changing environment. Since, for example, 
consumer lending and mortgage lending were 
virtually non-existent at the start of the decade, 
there has been considerable catching up as 
a result of declining interest rates, increased 
macroeconomic stability and new legislation. 
Relatively high rates of credit growth must 
be assessed in conjunction with other factors. 
These include the initial level of credit as a 
share of GDP, the level of market penetration 
and saturation in the segment, and the quality 
of the risk analysis by the individual banks 
extending the loans, which is in turn limited by 
a relatively short credit history and the adequacy 
of supervision of the banks’ risk analysis.
Historically, non-performing loans have been a 
key problem for the Turkish banking sector. In 
the past, problems have arisen in terms of related 
party lending and non-performing loans in the 
books of state-owned and privately-owned banks 
due to the economic downturn in the wake of 
the 2000 and 2001 ﬁ  nancial crises. The ensuing 
restructuring programme has helped to address 
these issues. Related party lending was restricted 
by a new regulation and state-owned banks were 
recapitalised to improve the provisioning of non-
performing loans. The non-performing loans of 
privately-owned banks were addressed as part of 
the “Istanbul Approach”, a voluntary framework 
aimed at facilitating the debt restructuring of 
mainly large corporate borrowers. Nowadays, 
“Istanbul Approach” loans represent only a 
small fraction of banks’ loan portfolios. More 
recently, the so-called “Anatolian Approach” 
aims to do the same for small and medium-sized 
enterprises. As a result, the overall ratio of non-
performing loans decreased substantially to less 
than 4% of total loans at the end of 2007 from 
around 25% in 2001. At the same time, loan loss 
provisions increased over the same period from 
49% to 88% of non-performing loans.
The non-performing loan ratio for corporate 
loans declined gradually from 19% at the end 
of 2002 to 4% at the end of 2007. The ratio for 
all consumer loans declined slightly to 2.9% at 
the end of 2007, from 3.2% at the end of 2005. 
However, the non-performing loan ratio for credit 
cards increased rapidly in early 2005 and has 
remained between 6% and 7% since then. While 
the overall picture in terms of non-performing 
loans does not seem to give rise to an immediate 
cause for concern, given the relatively low overall 
levels of non-performing loans and the adequate 
provision coverage, they could increase again in 
the future if the indebtedness of the private sector 
and households becomes unsustainable.35
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Table 22 Turkey: selected banking sector stability indicators
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Credit risk
Domestic credit growth  1), 2) %, y-o-y 28.3 20.6 21.6 27.9 14.3 23.4  8)
Real domestic credit growth  1), 2), 3) %, y-o-y -1.4 2.2 12.3 20.2 4.7 19.2  8)
Credit growth to the private 
sector  1), 2) %, y-o-y 11.4 44.6 52.8 67.1 36.1 40.5  8)
Real credit growth to the private 
sector  1), 2), 3) %, y-o-y -18.3 26.2 43.5 59.4 26.5 36.3  8)
Credit growth to households %, y-o-y 33.4 98.5 111.3 70.6 48.0 37.9
Growth of consumer housing loans %, y-o-y 2.4 90.0 203.0 367.8 79.3 40.1
Non-performing loans  4) % of total loans 17.6 11.5 6.0 4.8 3.8 3.5
Past due loans % of total assets 6.0 4.2 2.8 1.6 1.5 1.5
Foreign currency loans % of total loans 58.9 45.4 35.2 28.5 26.5 24.9
Foreign currency deposits % of total deposits 57.3 48.6 44.7 36.4 38.9 34.9
Growth of foreign liabilities %, y-o-y 11.9 0.4 14.1 15.1 29.0 2.3
Foreign liabilities % of total liabilities 57.3 50.2 47.1 41.2 42.6 38.1
Market risk
Interest rate risk
Interest income % of total assets 20.9 15.7 13.2 10.7 11.2 12.2
Net non-interest income % of total assets -2.4 -0.2 -2.3 -1.8 -0.9 -1.1
Forex risk
Foreign exchange assets % of foreign 
exchange liabilities 85.7 87.8 90.1 88.6 89.3 80.1
Foreign exchange assets % of total assets 43.2 38.0 36.2 31.7 33.5 24.1
Foreign exchange liabilities % of total liabilities 50.4 43.3 40.1 35.7 37.6 35.0
Net open foreign exchange 
position % of Tier I capital -3.5 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.3 0.1
Liquidity risk
Liquid assets  5), 6) % of total assets 12.1 11.1 10.0 11.6 11.4 26.8
Ratio of loans to deposits 35.5 42.6 52.0 61.7 70.7 79.4
Liquid assets 5), 7) % of short-term 
liabilities 24.9 27.7 23.2 22.5 19.6 112.6
Shock-absorbing factors
Net interest margin between loans 
and deposits % points 7.4 5.6 6.7 6.0 5.2 4.8
Loan loss provisions 
(speciﬁ  c provisions)
% of gross non-
performing loans 64.2 88.5 88.1 89.8 90.8 88.4
Capital adequacy ratio  25.6 31.0 28.8 24.2 22.0 19.0
Memorandum items:
Number of banks (foreign-owned) 54 (18) 50 (16) 48 (15) 47 (15) 46 (19) 46 (22)
Assets of foreign-owned banks % of total assets 4.0 3.0 4.0 6.0 13.0 15.0
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
Note: Unless stated otherwise, participation banks whose share in total assets of the banking sector was 3.3% in December 2007 are 
excluded.
1) Domestic credit growth and credit growth to the private sector ﬁ  gures are taken from the Monetary Sector Analytical Balance Sheet.
2) Participation Banks are included.
3) Deﬂ  ated using CPI.
4) Non-performing Loan Ratio = Gross non-performing loans / Gross Loans.
5) Liquid assets = cash + due from Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey + due from interbank + due from banks + securities available 
for sale + securities in trading portfolio.
6) In the current regulation regarding the measurement and assessment of liquidity requirements of banks which became effective in June 
2007, securities held in the trading portfolio are included in the total liquid assets with their stock value, regardless of their remaining 
maturities. For this reason, the numerator of the ratio which is the total liquid assets for the maturity bracket up to one month increased 
compared to the previous year. Before, such assets were included only according to their remaining maturity.
7) In the current regulation regarding the measurement and assessment of liquidity requirements of banks which became effective in June 
2007, securities held in the trading portfolio are included in the total liquid assets with their stock value, regardless of their remaining 
maturities. For this reason, the numerator of the ratio which is the total liquid assets for the maturity bracket up to one month increased 
compared to the previous year. Before, such assets were included only according to their remaining maturity. In addition, the total liquid 
liabilities for the maturity bracket up to one month also decreased compared to the previous year, since with the regulation some of the 
liabilities are taken into account by using weights based on their demand features.
8) September 2007.36
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MARKET AND LIQUIDITY RISK
Interest rate risk is the dominant factor in market 
risk, due to the maturity mismatch between 
loans and government securities on the one hand 
and customer deposits on the other, followed by 
exchange rate risk.
During the emerging market sell-off in May 
and June 2006, Turkish ﬁ  nancial markets were 
harder hit than most other emerging markets due 
to high inﬂ  ation ﬁ  gures. This resulted in a sharp 
depreciation of the lira and prompted the Central 
Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) to raise 
interest rates in order to save the disinﬂ  ation 
programme.
Owing to the continuing decline in interest rates 
before June 2006, Turkish banks started offering 
longer-term assets, backed by short-term 
funding. Deposits, which are traditionally short-
term (0-3 months), make up the lion’s share of 
the sector’s funding base, while the maturity of 
loans has increased substantially. At the end of 
2002 loans under one year dominated the loan 
portfolio (56% of total loans). As maturities were 
extended in the following years, loans over two 
years made up 43% of total loans by September 
2007, compared with 41% for loans under one 
year, and 16% for loans between one and two 
years. Consequently, there is an important 
maturity mismatch that is still growing. 
Fixed interest rate loans have also increased in 
the past few years. These elements leave the 
Turkish banking sector vulnerable to an adverse 
interest rate shock, especially if the spread 
between average lending and funding rates 
becomes smaller. 
Since the losses after the ﬂ  oating of the Turkish 
lira, banks’ exposure to exchange rate risk has 
been greatly reduced. Prior to the 2000-2001 
crises, the banking sector viewed the exchange 
rate risk as limited, as the lira was pegged and the 
CBRT intervened to stabilise the exchange rate. 
Consequently, many banks borrowed in foreign 
exchange and lent in domestic currency at high 
rates (including to the Treasury), leading to 
large open positions. When the lira was ﬂ  oated, 
the sector incurred signiﬁ  cant foreign exchange 
losses. The subsequent gradual restructuring of 
the banking sector has led to a decrease in the 
exchange rate risk borne by the sector and, by 
the end of 2004, the exchange rate positions in 
the banking sector were broadly in equilibrium. 
Liquidity (see Table 22) is deemed ample and 
liquidity ratios remained stable in 2005 and 
2006 at around 11.4% (at end-2006). Due to 
new regulation regarding the measurement and 
assessment of liquidity, liquid assets over total 
assets increased to 26.8% at the end of 2007. 
However, given the short-term maturity of the 
banks’ funding base and the fact that all banks 
still have considerable amounts of government 
securities on their balance sheets, liquidity could 
become a problem in times of systemic stress.
SHOCK-ABSORBING FACTORS
The Turkish banking sector has increased its 
shock-absorption capacity since the 2000 and 
2001 crises. Proﬁ  tability levels are adequate and 
appear to be more sustainable in the long run, in 
contrast to the proﬁ  ts of the 1990s that stemmed 
from the government’s unsustainable ﬁ  nancing 
needs. At the same time, the capital adequacy 
ratio increased from 21% in 2001 to 31% in 
2003, after which it declined again to 19% at the 
end of 2007.
During 2006 the levels of bank capital decreased 
temporarily, as the banks’ government securities 
portfolios are marked-to-market. This was 
especially the case for the privately-owned 
banks, as the state-owned banks still hold non-
marketable government securities (paying 
premium interest rates), which consequently 
are not marked-to-market. These remaining 
non-marketable government securities are set 
to mature though. When the markets recovered, 
banks’ capital levels improved again. The fact 
that Turkish banks still hold relatively large 
government securities portfolios explains why 
the capital adequacy ratio of the banking sector 
is higher than in the EU. With a transition to 
Basel II, it is expected that the current capital 
adequacy ratio of the Turkish banking sector 
would decrease by around 5.6 percentage points.37
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Sensitivity analyses by the IMF and the CBRT 
suggest that the capital of the banking sector would 
be large enough to absorb the impact of a negative 
combined interest rate and exchange rate shock. 
However, were the external shock to be protracted 
and substantial, generating negative balance sheet 
effects in the non-ﬁ  nancial sector and a severe 
economic downturn, the ensuing credit portfolio 
shock would pose a major risk for the stability of 
the Turkish ﬁ  nancial sector (see Box 2).
Box 2 
RESILIENCE OF THE TURKISH FINANCIAL SECTOR TO EXTERNAL SHOCKS – A STOCK-TAKING 
EXERCISE
The current account deﬁ  cit and its ﬁ  nancing remain major macroeconomic vulnerabilities for 
the Turkish economy. The current account deﬁ  cit averaged above 7% of GDP between 2005 
and 2007 and is projected to approach 8% in the course of 2008 by the IMF. Until 2007, the 
positive economic performance of Turkey, the resumption of inward foreign direct investment 
as well as relatively loose global ﬁ  nancial conditions contributed to large capital inﬂ  ows, which 
permitted a smooth ﬁ  nancing of this deﬁ  cit. Recently, though, the external ﬁ  nancial environment 
has changed and global liquidity conditions have tightened, leading to a reassessment of risks by 
global investors, which could penalise those emerging markets with still large external deﬁ  cits. 
Indeed, in November 2007, the IMF Mission Chief to Turkey deﬁ  ned the external account 
position as the “Achilles heel” of Turkey (see IMF, 2007a).
Sudden stops in capital ﬂ  ows, as reﬂ  ected in a decline in these ﬂ  ows by several percentage 
points of GDP in one year, may be very costly, in particular for emerging market economies. 
Calvo et al. (2004) ﬁ  nd that sudden stops are accompanied by major interest rate upswings, 
reserve losses and, in particular for emerging markets, large real exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations. 
The latter exacerbate the adjustment costs for emerging economies with large liability 
dollarisation, i.e. a high level of foreign exchange-indexed or -denominated liabilities. Sudden 
stops in capital ﬂ  ows do not necessarily entail a current account reversal – e.g. a reduction 
in the current account deﬁ  cit by several percentage points of GDP in one year – as long as 
international reserves may be used to smooth the adjustment. However, Edwards (2004), based 
on a dataset of 157 countries over the period 1970-2001, notes that almost half of the countries 
experiencing a sudden stop had to face also a sharp adjustment of the current account deﬁ  cit. 
This probability tends to increase for emerging and developing countries, which generally face 
more stringent borrowing constraints in the international markets than industrial countries. 
Current account reversals are then often associated with a slowdown in economic growth 
(see Algieri and Bracke, 2007).
To what extent is the Turkish ﬁ  nancial sector ready to withstand an external shock transmitted 
through the portfolio and credit channel, impacting on the level of interest rates and the exchange 
rate of the lira? We attempt to answer this question by looking at the impact of the relatively 
recent spring 2006 crisis on the banking sector and by carrying out a stock-taking exercise of the 
analyses conducted by the IMF and the Turkish central bank of the banking sector’s sensitivity 
to interest rate and exchange rate shocks.38
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In spring 2006 global ﬁ  nancial market instability took a heavy toll on Turkish ﬁ  nancial markets. 
Between the beginning of May and the end of June, the Turkish lira depreciated sharply by around 
30% against the US dollar and the euro, interest rates increased by around 5 percentage points, 
long-term bond spreads widened by 150 basis points and the Istanbul Stock Exchange fell by 25%. 
However, from a macroeconomic perspective, the crisis was short-lived. The policy reaction of 
the CBRT – which raised the overnight borrowing rate by 400 basis points and maintained the 
tightening bias – and the subsiding global ﬁ  nancial instability contributed to a sharp decline in 
domestic ﬁ  nancial market volatility in the second half of 2006. Portfolio capital inﬂ  ows resumed 
by the end of the summer and Turkish ﬁ  nancial markets recovered most of the lost ground, even 
though they underperformed relative to the emerging markets’ asset class in 2006. 
The Turkish banking sector weathered the spell of ﬁ  nancial market turmoil quite well, thanks to a 
high capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and a balanced foreign exchange position. The capital adequacy 
ratio fell sharply during the period of turbulence, from 24% of risk-weighted assets in 2005 to a 
trough of 19% in June 2006, to a large extent driven down by valuation losses on the holding of 
government securities. However, by the end of 2006, the ratio had already rebounded to 22% on the 
back of rising asset prices and, in some cases, capital injections. The turmoil had also virtually no 
impact on credit quality, with non-performing loans continuing to decline as a share of total loans.
This recent episode reveals an improvement in the ability of the banking sector to cope with 
a major shock that does not affect negatively credit quality on a sustained basis. Indeed, the 
short-lived nature of the episode and the absence of major negative feedback effects on the 
real economy have – fortunately – lessened the impact and the importance of this shock. This 
positive assessment is corroborated by the sensitivity analyses of the IMF and the CBRT, which 
both conﬁ  rm that the Turkish banking sector is well positioned to face a major combined shock 
on interest rates and the Turkish lira exchange rate.
The sensitivity analysis of the IMF (2007b) shows that even under the assumption of a strong 
depreciation of the Turkish lira by 45% combined with a domestic currency interest rate increase 
from 4% to 15% along the yield curve (3% to 10% for rates on FX positions), the capital 
adequacy ratio would decline by up to ﬁ  ve percentage points in the worst-case scenario, but 
would remain above the regulatory 12% threshold. The impact of the exchange rate depreciation 
would be relatively muted due to the balanced foreign exchange position of the banking sector, 
whereas most of the losses would come from shifts in the yield curve (see Table A). 
Table A Sensitivity analysis of the IMF financial stability assessment - selected results
Top-down Bottom-up
Exchange rate depreciation (%) 45 45 45 45
Impact on yield curve Positive tilt (short/long) Negative tilt (short/long) Positive tilt (short/long) Negative tilt (short/long)
Interest rate increase -YTL (%) 4 to 15 15 to 4 4 to 15 15 to 4
Interest rate increase - FX (%) 3 to 10 10 to 3 3 to 10 10 to 3
End-2005 CAR before shock 22.9 22.9 21.9 21.9
Post-shock CAR 21.1 17.6 16.5 18.2
Notes System wide CAR Average CAR of 9 participating banks accounting for 
80% of banking assets
Source: IMF (2007b).39
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The Turkish central bank also runs a sensitivity analysis on the impact of a combined exchange 
rate and interest rate shock on the domestic banking sector (see CBRT, 2007). In the central 
bank’s exercise, the exchange rate of the Turkish lira is assumed to depreciate by 30%, whereas 
Turkish lira interest rates increase from 6% to 11% under different scenarios. Interest rates 
on foreign currency positions increase as well. Notably, the exchange rate shock brings some 
extra proﬁ  ts to the banking sector as a whole owing to its long foreign exchange position. These 
foreign exchange-related proﬁ  ts are however much smaller than the losses stemming from a 
decline in interest income and a reduction in the market value of securities following the increase 
in interest rates. Eventually, losses range from 5% to 7% of banks’ equity, leading to a decline 
in the capital adequacy ratio by more than one percentage point (see Table B). The negative 
impact, nevertheless, is not so severe and the capital adequacy ratio remains well above the legal 
threshold after the shock. Overall, the results of the central bank’s exercise are qualitatively 
similar to those of the IMF, even though they differ in terms of magnitude.
The sensitivity analyses that have been presented so far indicate that the Turkish banking sector is 
resilient to a combined exchange rate and interest rate shock. However, one might wonder whether 
the sector would be able to cope with a major and long-lasting shock affecting the macroeconomic 
outlook and the quality of the loan portfolio. As noted, a sustained depreciation of the Turkish lira 
does not affect the consolidated balance sheet of the banking sector, but it may have a negative 
impact on the balance sheet of the non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms that have unhedged short foreign exchange 
positions. Indeed, Kesriyeli et al. (2005) note that the level of the liability dollarisation of the 
Turkish corporate sector is very high by international standards and that sectors with low export 
ratios − lacking therefore a natural hedge − are also heavily dollarised. Kesriyeli et al. (2005) ﬁ  nd 
that real exchange rate depreciations in Turkey, eventually, lead to a contraction in investment and 
proﬁ  ts for the non-ﬁ  nancial sector as a whole. In this case, the ﬁ  nancial sector would be indirectly 
hit by the depreciation through a worsening of the loan portfolio over the medium term.
Indeed, IMF (2007b) includes a macro-scenario analysis taking into account the possibility of 
a sudden stop in capital ﬂ  ows and its impact on GDP growth, unemployment, prices, as well as 
interest rates and the exchange rate. In this scenario, the impact of an external shock is much 
worse than in the previous sensitivity analyses as the economy slows down and the quality of 
banks’ credit portfolio deteriorates rapidly. According to IMF estimates, the CAR would decline 
by nine percentage points with respect to end-2005. More importantly, under this worst-case 
scenario, up to four small and medium-sized banks would require an injection of fresh capital 
from shareholders in order to bring the CAR above the Basel threshold of 8%.
Table B Sensitivity analysis of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey - selected results
Scenario A Scenario B
Exchange rate depreciation (%) 30 30
Impact on yield curve Parallel shift over maturities to 3 months U-shaped over maturities to 6 months
Interest rate increase -YTL (%) 6 9 to 8 to 11
Interest rate increase - FX (%) 5 1.1 to 0.7 to 1.1
2006 Sep. 2007 2006 Sep. 2007
Current CAR before shock 19.8 17.8 19.8 17.8
Post-shock CAR 18.8 16.7 18.6 16.6
Notes Interest rate increase lasting 3 months. Market 
value of Eurobond trading portfolio decreases 
by 5%
Interest rate increase lasting 6 months. Interest 
rate changes twice as large as in Spring 2006. 
Market value of Eurobond trading portfolio 
decreases by 5%
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (2007).40
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Considerable progress has been made in 
strengthening the regulatory and supervisory 
framework, especially following the adoption of 
a new Banking Law in 2005. The main authority 
responsible for supervising and regulating the 
banking sector is the Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency (BRSA). Following the 
2000 and 2001 crises, the BRSA overhauled 
the regulatory and supervisory framework, 
bringing it more into line with best practices. As 
a result, supervision has improved considerably, 
especially after 2005, so that some of the main 
problems leading to the 2000 and 2001 crises 
should be able to be avoided in the future. 
The blanket deposit guarantee was replaced in 
2004 by a limited deposit insurance of up to 
50,000 Turkish lira. This deposit insurance is 
managed by the SDIF, which is also responsible 
for dealing with failing banks, once they are 
transferred to the SDIF by the BRSA.
In conclusion, the experience of the spring 2006 crisis and the available sensitivity analyses 
indicate that the ﬁ   nancial sector of Turkey would be able to cope with the impact of a 
negative combined interest rate and exchange rate shock. However, were the external shock 
to be protracted and substantial, generating negative balance sheet effects in the non-ﬁ  nancial 
sector and a severe economic downturn, the ensuing credit portfolio shock would represent a
non-negligible risk for the stability of the Turkish ﬁ  nancial sector.41
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5 HORIZONTAL  ISSUES
5.1  POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKET TURMOIL 
The global ﬁ  nancial market turmoil that started 
in mid-2007 has had comparatively limited 
consequences for candidate countries so far. 
Potential spillover effects are the smallest in 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
due to the country’s relatively small current 
account deﬁ   cit. External vulnerability is 
more pronounced in Croatia, even though 
its exposure to international investors 
remains small and the current account 
deﬁ  cit has lately been ﬁ  nanced smoothly by 
capital inﬂ   ows of longer maturity. External 
vulnerability is highest in Turkey, making 
the country the most susceptible among the 
candidate countries to a sudden deterioration 
in sentiment towards emerging market assets. 
The lending behaviour of foreign banks, an 
important  ﬁ   nancing channel for all three 
candidate countries, has not shown signs of 
signiﬁ  cant change so far but warrants close 
monitoring in the future. 
POTENTIAL CHANNELS OF TRANSMISSION OF 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SHOCKS
The transmission of global ﬁ  nancial  shocks 
depends crucially on (i) the degree of external 
imbalances and (ii) the degree of foreign 
involvement in the ﬁ   nancial markets of 
candidate countries. External imbalances 
are pronounced in Croatia and Turkey, with 
current account deﬁ  cits of 8.6% and 5.6% of 
GDP in 2007, respectively (see Chart 1). The 
situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia is more favourable, as it displayed 
a comparatively smaller current account deﬁ  cit 
of only 3.2% of GDP in 2007. Current account 
deﬁ  cits over the period 2005-2007 have been 
more than covered by corresponding net 
ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ   ows, allowing all three countries 
to accumulate foreign exchange reserves. In 
Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, these inﬂ   ows were heavily 
dominated by foreign direct investment. In 
contrast, Turkey could only partly cover its 
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external  ﬁ   nancing needs by foreign direct 
investment, making the country dependent on 
portfolio and other investment ﬂ  ows.
Foreign participation in the ﬁ  nancial systems is 
highest in Turkey. The country’s portfolio 
investment liabilities as a share of GDP reached 
9.8% and 8.6% by December 2007 for equity 
and debt securities, respectively, compared with 
4.0% and 12.7% in Croatia and only 1.5% and 
3.4% in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (see Table 23). These differences in 
foreign portfolio positions are partly the result 
of different states of domestic ﬁ  nancial market 
development.19 Apart from portfolio investment, 
other investment liabilities, to a large extent in 
the form of foreign loans, are a key channel of 
foreign  ﬁ   nancial involvement as well. These 
inﬂ  ows dwarf portfolio investment in Croatia 
and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
and also constitute a large part of cross-border 
ﬁ  nancial transactions in Turkey. A more detailed 
discussion of the build-up of foreign debt, in 
particular by the private sector, is provided in 
Section 5.3.
Overall, Turkey seems to be the most vulnerable 
to bouts of rising risk aversion towards emerging 
market assets, since (i) it depends on a constant 
inﬂ   ow of portfolio and other investment 
to  ﬁ   nance the current account deﬁ  cit  and 
(ii) foreign participation in domestic ﬁ  nancial 
markets is relatively pronounced. 
THE EVIDENCE SO FAR
The external vulnerabilities notwithstanding, 
ﬁ   nancial markets in candidate countries 
have shown some resilience to the global 
ﬁ   nancial market turbulence since mid-2007. 
Stock markets outperformed the MSCI 
emerging markets index until the end of 2007 
(see Chart 2). Turkey’s stock market 
mirrored the benchmark very closely, as the 
global episodes of heightened volatility in 
March 2007, July-August 2007 and 
January 2008 were reﬂ  ected in Turkish share 
Turkey’s  ﬁ   nancial markets are most advanced and therefore  19 
offer the largest potential for foreign involvement, with Croatia 
following in second place. Although Croatia’s stock market 
capitalisation as a share of GDP surpasses that of Turkey, the 
liquidity of its market is only a fraction of that in Turkey.
Table 23 Size of financial markets in candidate countries and foreign participation
(percentage of GDP)
Croatia FYR Macedonia Turkey Euro area as of
Size of ﬁ  nancial markets
Stock market capitalisation 67.5 17.4 30.7 77.4 Dec. 06
Stock market liquidity  1) 4.2 3.1 43.0 92.0 Dec. 06
Bond and money market size  2) 31.6 5.0 37.2 229.4 June 07
of which:
Domestic  3) bond and money market 18.6 0.0 33.2 135.9 Sep. 07
International  3) bond market 14.4 5.1 7.1 101.7 Sep. 07
International  3) money market 0.1 0.0 0.0 5.5 Sep. 07
International investment position
Portfolio investment liabilites, equity securities 4.0 1.5 9.8 37.4 Dec. 07  4)
Portfolio investment liabilities, debt securities 12.7 3.4 8.6 37.9 Dec. 07  4)
Other investment liabilites, total 70.3 34.7 31.6 60.4 Dec. 07  4)
of which:
Short-term 15.9 8.3 8.5 ... Dec. 07  4)
of which:
Loans to the government 8.8 15.4 4.6 0.5 Dec. 07  4)
Loans to banks 12.2 2.6 5.7 43.6 Dec. 07  4)
Deposits in banks  5) 11.9 2.0 4.1 ... Dec. 07  4)
Loans to other sectors 34.2 6.0 13.9 11.3 Dec. 07  4)
Sources: National sources, Standard & Poor's, Haver Analytics, BIS, ECB, IMF and own calculations.
1) Annual value traded.
2) Outstanding bond and money market issues as a share of GDP.
3) BIS deﬁ  nitions; see BIS (2005).
4) FYR Macedonia: December 2006; euro area: September 2007.
5) Including currency held with banks.43
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prices. In contrast, the indices of Croatia and 
especially the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia appear to be more detached from 
global developments, again highlighting 
their lower level of integration with world 
ﬁ   nancial markets. Nevertheless, both markets 
have decreased signiﬁ   cantly since reaching 
their respective peaks in September 2007 (the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and 
October 2007 (Croatia). 
In line with the trends observed in other 
emerging markets, debt market indicators show 
a worsening of (external) ﬁ  nancing conditions. 
Sovereign bond spreads and ﬁ  ve-year  CDS 
spreads have widened in both Croatia and 
Turkey, although they appear to have been 
overly compressed before the onset of the global 
ﬁ  nancial turmoil (see Chart 3).20
Turning to credit markets, the impact of the 
strains visible in some parts of the global ﬁ  nancial 
system on both domestic banks and on foreign 
banks doing business with candidate countries 
appeared limited in early 2008. Domestic banks 
had a very low or non-existent exposure to 
market segments directly affected by the fallout. 
As for foreign banking groups active in candidate 
countries, there was no comprehensive evidence 
yet of a possible change in lending behaviour. 
Complete data on cross-border bank lending are 
currently available as of the second quarter of 
2007, i.e. before the onset of the credit crisis in 
August 2007. Balance of payments data from 
candidate countries encompass the fourth quarter 
of 2007 by now, but lack any indication of major 
reversals in capital ﬂ   ows so far. Almost all 
For the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, these indicators  20 
are not available, underlining the country’s shallow (external) 
debt market.
Chart 2 Stock market developments in 
candidate countries
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Chart 3 EMBIG euro sovereign spreads and 
five-year CDS spreads of candidate countries
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cross-border loans to Croatia and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia originate from 
banks headquartered in the European Union, 
with only Turkey displaying a notable share 
of borrowing from banks in the United States 
(see Table 24).
In Croatia, banks from Austria, Italy and 
France are most heavily involved, providing 
41%, 37% and 13% of all foreign borrowing. 
In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
the origination of non-domestic loans is even 
more homogenous, with Greek banks 
accounting for more than four-ﬁ  fths of these 
ﬂ   ows, whereas the structure of this market 
seems more diversiﬁ  ed in Turkey. Evidently, 
any major loss stemming from the credit crisis 
at a bank also operating in the candidate 
countries has the potential to dampen the 
extension of loans to these destinations. 
However, it appears that most banks active in 
candidate countries have been largely shielded 
from these events until now.21 Additional 
evidence is offered by the virtual absence of 
any tensions in money markets, with three-
month interest rates closely following the 
central banks’ policies in Turkey and Croatia 
(see Chart 4).22 The spike in money market 
rates in Croatia coinciding with the start of the 
credit turmoil in the summer of 2007 is 
exclusively related to domestic reasons, mainly 
the sizeable initial public offering of HT 
(Croatian Telecom) around that time which 
drained liquidity from the money market.
Finally, the development of Croatia’s and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s 
exchange rates and the continuous rise in their 
foreign exchange reserves does not currently 
indicate any substantial capital outﬂ  ows.  The 
exchange rate of the Macedonian denar and 
the Croatian kuna versus the euro, against 
which both currencies are managed by their 
respective central banks, have remained 
stable so far, with the kuna even experiencing 
The most important foreign banks represented either directly, via  21 
a foreign subsidiary or by maintaining a cooperation with a local 
bank are: Croatia: UniCredit Group (Italy), Intesa SanPaolo 
(Italy), ERSTE Group (Austria), Raiffeisen International 
(Austria) and Société Générale (France); the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia: UniCredit Group, KBC (Belgium), 
Société Générale and NBG (Greece); Turkey: Citigroup (United 
States), GE Group (United States), UniCredit Group and NBG.
Since the beginning of 2007, the Central Bank of the Republic of  22 
Turkey has lowered its policy rate from 17.5% to 15.25%. The 
Croatian National Bank, although limited in its use of monetary 
policy instruments by its tightly managed ﬂ  oat against the euro, 
has implemented several administrative measures to limit credit 
extension in 2007 and 2008 (see Box 1). In addition, it has 
scaled down the scope and frequency of its repo operations since 
October 2007, thus effectively tightening monetary conditions.
Table 24 Claims of BIS reporting banks on candidate countries (June 2007)
(percentages, unless indicated otherwise)
Croatia FYR Macedonia Turkey
All claims 100.0 100.0 100.0
of which:
United States 0.3 0.4 12.6
European Union 1) 98.8 95.3 77.2
of which:
Austria 41.1 4.6 0.9
Belgium 0.6 0.8 12.0
France 12.6 0.0 11.1
Germany 5.9 3.5 13.7
Greece 0.2 81.1 15.7
Italy 36.8 1.4 2.8
United Kingdom 0.6 0.6 12.4
Other European Union 1) 1.1 3.3 8.5
Memorandum items:
Volume of claims of EU banks (USD billion) 69.9 1.3 93.8
Volume of claims of EU banks (% of all foreign claims) 0.9 0.0 1.2
Sources: BIS and own calculations.
1) EU-15 only; EU-10 countries do not report data to the BIS.45
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some appreciation pressure since early 2008 
(see Chart 5, top panel). In contrast, the Turkish 
lira, while displaying considerable resilience 
for extended periods of time since the onset 
of the ﬁ   nancial market turmoil, depreciated 
signiﬁ   cantly starting in late February 2008, 
mainly on the back of a deteriorating 
inﬂ   ationary outlook and heightened political 
uncertainties which put the country’s 
existing external vulnerabilities back in focus 
(see Chart 5, bottom panel).
5.2  FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
USE OF FOREIGN CURRENCIES
Financial instruments denominated in or 
indexed to foreign currencies, in particular 
the euro, are widely used in the candidate 
countries. In the balance sheets of banks, 
currency mismatches tend to be limited as 
foreign currency assets are broadly covered by 
foreign currency liabilities (foreign borrowing 
or foreign currency deposits). At the same time, 
banks face indirect credit risk as their borrowers 
are exposed to currency mismatches and may 
face increasing debt servicing costs following 
domestic currency depreciation or a rise in 
foreign interest rates. These risks are mitigated 
by the steady accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves, increasing the ability of central banks 
to stem exchange rate depreciation pressures. As 
monetary policy can often play only a limited 
role in containing foreign currency lending 
in catching-up economies, other policy tools, 
including promotion of risk awareness through 
improvements in ﬁ   nancial literacy, moral 
suasion and prudential measures, can help keep 
foreign currency lending under control.
TRENDS IN THE USE OF FOREIGN CURRENCIES
As already pointed out in ECB (2006), currency 
mismatches may be an important source of 
vulnerability. In the candidate countries, foreign 
currencies, in particular the euro, are used very 
widely in the ﬁ  nancial markets and, in Croatia 
and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 





























Note: High-frequency 3-month money market rates for FYR 
Macedonia are unavailable. Average 1-day interbank rates, 
however, decreased smoothly from 4.80% in January 2007 to 
3.08% in February 2008.
Chart 5 Exchange rates of candidate countries
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the euro is also used as an exchange rate anchor. 
These countries are indeed characterised by a 
high degree of asset substitution in both bank 
deposits and bank lending (see Backé and 
Walko, 2006, and ECB, 2007a).
With regard to bank deposits, the use of foreign 
currencies as a store of value is mainly explained 
by a lack of conﬁ   dence in macroeconomic 
and price stability, fuelled by the negative 
experience of high inﬂ  ation and rapid currency 
depreciation in the past. The phenomenon has 
proved to be fairly persistent over time, despite 
increasing success in macroeconomic and 
ﬁ   nancial stabilisation. According to the most 
recent estimates, the share of bank deposits 
denominated in or indexed to foreign currency 
stood at around 35% in Turkey, 53% in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
75% in Croatia (Table 25).23 While there are no 
foreign currency-indexed deposits in Turkey, 
such deposits play some limited role in the other 
two countries.
The combined share of foreign currency-
denominated and -indexed deposits has fallen in 
recent years in all three candidate countries.24 
This decline has been most steady in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, while the 
downward trend in the two other countries has 
been surrounded by a higher degree of volatility. 
In Croatia, in 2005 and 2006, the decline in 
foreign currency-denominated deposits was, to 
some extent, offset by an increase in the share of 
domestic currency-denominated deposits 
indexed to foreign currencies. However, in the 
ﬁ  rst nine months of 2007, a signiﬁ  cant decline 
in the share of indexed loans more than 
compensated for a mild rise in the share of 
foreign currency-denominated loans. In the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the 
decline in foreign currency-denominated 
deposits was, to some extent, offset by an 
increase in the share of domestic currency-
denominated deposits indexed to foreign 
currencies in 2006 and 2007. When looking at 
the available disaggregated ﬁ   gures, it is 
noteworthy that the shares of foreign currency-
denominated deposits are signiﬁ  cantly higher in 
the household sector than for non-ﬁ  nancial 
corporations.
Foreign currencies play a pervasive role also 
with regard to bank lending. Foreign currency 
loans have become attractive due to low interest 
rates on the major international currencies, 
in the apparent expectation that interest rate 
differentials would not be wiped out by domestic 
currency depreciation. Moreover, for some 
borrowers, foreign currency debt payments 
may smooth earnings ﬂ  uctuations arising from 
export revenues in foreign currency. In some 
cases, banks have spurred the supply of foreign 
currency loans as this provided a natural hedge 
for their foreign currency liabilities (resulting 
from foreign currency deposits or foreign 
borrowing). Recent empirical evidence indicates 
For Turkey, the shares relate to all sectors, while for Croatia and  23 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia the shares relate to 
non-bank corporations and households.
One complication in assessing trends over time is that the share  24 
of foreign currency deposits (and loans) tends to be inﬂ  uenced 
by the statistical effect of exchange rate changes. Such valuation 
effects can be particularly important in Turkey, which operates a 
ﬂ  exible exchange rate regime.
Table 25 Foreign currency deposits in candidate countries in 2007
(percentages)
Croatia  1),  2) FYR Macedonia  2) Turkey  3)
Share of foreign currency deposits of households and non-bank corporations  75.2 52.9 34.9
of which:
Share of foreign currency deposits of households  84.7 54.5 64.0
Share of foreign currency deposits of non-bank corporations  46.3 32.7 ...
Source: National sources.
1) September 2007.
2) Time deposits only.
3) Data refer to deposits of all sectors of the economy.47
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that the access to foreign funds, which has 
accompanied the increasing presence of foreign 
banks, has contributed to the rise in foreign 
currency lending (see ECB, 2007a).
According to the latest data, bank loans 
denominated in or indexed to foreign currency 
accounted for around 63% of all loans to 
households and enterprises in Croatia, 55% in 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
and 29% in Turkey (see Table 26).25 
The use of foreign currency loans and loans 
indexed to foreign currency has developed 
differently over time across the candidate 
countries. Since 2004, the combined share of 
foreign currency loans and loans indexed to 
foreign currency rose noticeably in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, while it 
declined in Turkey and in Croatia, in the latter 
case due to several measures imposed by the 
CNB to curtail bank lending (see Box 1). In 
Croatia, both the share of foreign currency 
loans and the share of loans indexed to foreign 
currencies diminished somewhat, with the latter 
however remaining very high, while in Turkey 
the share of foreign currency loans has fallen 
alongside a low and broadly constant share 
of foreign currency-indexed loans in recent 
years. Thus, the decline in the share of foreign 
currency-denominated loans in both countries 
was not due to substitution effects in favour 
of domestic currency loans indexed to foreign 
currencies. However, as Section 5.3 suggests, 
there has been some substitution of direct 
borrowing from abroad for domestic foreign 
currency/foreign currency-indexed borrowing 
by non-bank corporations in both countries. In 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
in contrast, foreign currency-indexed loans 
have risen particularly fast largely due to the 
lower interest rates offered for these types of 
loans compared with loans denominated in 
local currency. Part of the increase in indexed 
loans may, however, be due to statistical 
reasons (change in data collection method as of 
September 2006).
FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE 
OF FOREIGN CURRENCIES
The use of ﬁ  nancial instruments denominated 
in or indexed to foreign currencies may result 
in signiﬁ   cant currency mismatches. These 
mismatches can differ considerably across 
sectors:
In the banking sector, currency mismatches    •
are typically limited. Foreign currency 
assets (essentially foreign currency loans) 
tend to be broadly balanced by foreign 
currency liabilities (essentially foreign 
currency deposits and foreign borrowing). 
In addition, banks are relatively adept at 
hedging residual balances. According to 
published data, banks’ net overall foreign 
currency positions are small in Croatia and 
Turkey, being broadly comparable to those 
observed in countries that acceded to the EU 
in 2004 and 2007. In the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, the banking 
sector is long in foreign currencies so that 
depreciation risk is passed on to customers. 
For Turkey the shares relate to all sectors, while for Croatia and  25 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia the shares relate to 
non-bank corporations and households.
Table 26 Foreign currency loans in candidate countries in 2007
(percentages)
Croatia  1) FYR Macedonia Turkey  2)
Share of foreign currency loans to households and non-bank corporations 63.4 54.6 28.5
of which:
Share of foreign currency loans to households 69.1 44.3 0.7
Share of foreign currency loans to non-bank corporations 56.0 61.2 ...
Source: National sources.
1) September 2007.
2) Data refer to loans to all sectors of the economy.48
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However, in recent years this open position 
has been on a falling trend.
Among households, currency mismatches    •
tend to be large. As households usually 
do not have substantial foreign currency 
income, currency mismatch problems at the 
individual level are likely to be signiﬁ  cant, 
even if there may be no signiﬁ  cant currency 
mismatch at the aggregate level (see also 
Section 5.4). To assess this risk more 
thoroughly, an analysis based on micro data 
(which are not available) would be needed.
For non-bank corporations, there may be a    •
smaller probability of a currency mismatch 
than for households, at least in the tradable 
sector, since export revenues may hedge the 
residual exchange rate risk. Still, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that foreign currency 
borrowing in non-exporting sectors may be 
an issue in the three countries under review. 
This conﬁ   guration of currency mismatches 
implies that banks face substantial indirect credit 
risks as a result of foreign currency- related 
positions on the asset side, through a possible 
deterioration in their borrowers’ debt servicing 
capacity following a depreciation of the 
domestic currency or a rise in foreign interest 
rates. This situation may be accentuated by the 
fact that the non-bank corporate sector’s foreign 
indebtedness has increased signiﬁ  cantly  over 
the past few years (see Section 5.3), thereby 
increasing the exposure to exchange rate risk. 
Various policy measures may help contain the 
risks from large foreign currency exposure 
in the candidate countries. One measure 
that has mitigated these risks is the steady 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
(particularly in the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, but also, to a lesser extent, in 
the other two countries), which has increased 
the capacity of central banks to stem exchange 
rate depreciation pressures at times of tension. 
Monetary and exchange rate policies can 
contribute to containing foreign exchange 
lending, but their role is often limited by 
exchange rate commitments or considerations. 
Mandatory reserve regulations, which are at the 
disposal of policy-makers under any exchange 
rate regime, may offer some scope to affect 
the currency composition of bank liabilities, 
and some of the candidate countries have made 
use of this instrument. Under ﬁ  xed or tightly 
managed exchange rate regimes, it is important 
to raise awareness of the residual exchange 
rate risk. In this respect, customer information 
and education appear of crucial importance in 
order for this risk to be duly taken into account 
when clients make their borrowing decisions. 
Under  ﬂ   exible exchange rate regimes, higher 
exchange rate volatility can make borrowers 
more aware of the exchange rate risks connected 
to foreign currency borrowing, while on the 
other hand exchange rate ﬂ  exibility can itself 
be a source of shocks, with knock-on effects on 
ﬁ  nancial stability. Moral suasion and prudential 
measures can also help keep foreign currency 
lending under control. Prudential measures are 
particularly appropriate if and when foreign 
currency lending implies ﬁ  nancial stability risks. 
Finally, ﬁ  scal restraint – if leading to an increase 
in the domestic savings ratio – would serve to 
curtail credit growth in general, including the 
foreign currency element.
5.3  DOMESTIC CREDIT GROWTH AND FOREIGN 
BORROWING
Over recent years, the private sector in candidate 
countries has built up considerable foreign 
debt positions. Foreign ﬁ   nancing has allowed 
both the ﬁ   nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial  corporate 
sector to attract additional sources of funding, 
thereby overcoming macroeconomic constraints 
(e.g. limits to funding through domestic deposits) 
and, in some cases, bypassing regulatory restrictions 
(e.g. policy measures to curb credit growth). The 
reliance on foreign borrowing exposes ﬁ  nancial 
systems in candidate countries to two types of 
ﬁ  nancial stability risk. First, banks and enterprises 
run rollover risk in the event of a reversal of capital 
ﬂ  ows. Although a gradual lengthening of maturity 
of external debt, especially in the case of the 
Turkish banking system, has alleviated some of that 
concern, rollover risk remains relatively high in the 49
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former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Second, 
the rapid rise in foreign borrowing increasingly 
exposes the private sector to potentially large 
increases in debt servicing costs in case of sudden 
swings in international ﬁ   nancing conditions or 
exchange rates.
TRENDS IN FOREIGN BORROWING
Increasing integration in international ﬁ  nancial 
markets, capital account liberalisation, ﬁ  nancial 
sector reforms and prospective or actual EU 
accession have spurred large capital inﬂ  ows 
in central and south-eastern Europe. The 
composition of these inﬂ  ows has changed over 
time. While foreign direct investment initially 
made up the bulk of the inﬂ  ows, debt liabilities 
have gained importance in recent years. In 
several countries, rising external debt of the 
private sector has been associated with rapid 
domestic credit growth as foreign ﬁ  nancing has 
enabled banks to increase liabilities more rapidly 
than the expansion of the domestic deposit 
base would have allowed. As Chart 6 shows, 
countries with faster private credit expansion 
have experienced a substantial increase in 
private sector gross external debt.
Banks typically play a pivotal role in 
channelling foreign funds in these countries, 
particularly through branches and subsidiaries 
of foreign intermediaries. There are several 
reasons for the substantial borrowing from 
parent banks. In several countries the deposit 
base has not kept pace with credit expansion 
and the cost of funding in domestic markets is 
usually higher than that of funding that branches 
and subsidiaries can obtain from their foreign 
parent banks, especially in the environment of 
ample global liquidity observed in the last years. 
Moreover, the maturity of external funds may be 
more easily tailored to comply with the matching 
requirements of host country supervisors. 
In addition, direct external borrowing by 
non-bank  ﬁ   nancial intermediaries and 
non-ﬁ  nancial corporations has increased rapidly 
as well, partly in response to restrictions 
imposed in the domestic banking system. 
Among the three candidate countries, Croatia 
stands out in terms of banks’ and enterprises’ 
foreign debt levels, which reached 66% of GDP 
at the end of 2006 (see Table 27).
Showing a development similar to that of 
several new EU Member States in central 
and eastern Europe, Croatia experienced 
a substantial rise in private sector external 
Table 27 Gross external debt of banks and enterprises, 2006
(percentage of GDP)
Croatia FYR Macedonia Turkey EU-10  1) 
Banks 29.9 5.4 8.0 27.2
Other sectors  2) 27.6 15.9 15.2 19.2
Direct investment: intercompany lending 8.3 6.6 0.3 11.6
Gross external debt of banks and enterprises 65.8 28.0 23.5 58.0
Memorandum items:
Total gross external debt 85.3 50.3 39.3 70.9
Sources: National sources, Eurostat, IMF and Haver Analytics.
1) Unweighted average.
2) Non-bank ﬁ  nancial enterprises and non-ﬁ  nancial enterprises.
Chart 6 Credit growth and private foreign 
borrowing
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liabilities in connection with rapid credit 
expansion, driven by a strong increase in 
domestic banks’ external borrowing facilitated 
by easy access to ﬁ  nancing from parent banks 
in EU countries. However, following the 
adoption by the CNB of a series of prudential 
measures aimed at curbing domestic credit 
growth (see Box 1) the upward trend in banks’ 
external debt slowed and eventually reversed 
in 2007, while there has been a rapid expansion 
of external foreign borrowing by non-ﬁ  nancial 
corporations, partly due to domestic banks 
encouraging their clients to borrow directly 
from their parent banks, and by non-bank 
ﬁ  nancial enterprises (see Chart 7).
In Turkey, the level of external indebtedness 
is relatively low if compared with central and 
eastern European countries, notwithstanding 
buoyant credit expansion in recent years. 
Following a signiﬁ   cant fall in the aftermath 
of the 2001 crisis, private external debt 
ratios have rebounded in recent years, as 
banks rely increasingly on foreign inﬂ  ows 
to  ﬁ   nance credit expansion and corporations 
are extensively using external borrowing as 
their main ﬁ   nancing source. Indeed, partly 
owing to ﬁ   nancial transaction taxes and 
restrictions on foreign currency lending, a 
signiﬁ   cant portion of the domestic corporate 
sector’s external borrowing is from offshore 
subsidiaries and branches of Turkish banks 
(see Section 4). The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia shows the lowest level of foreign debt 
in banking and corporate sectors, at 28% of GDP 
in 2006, even though there has been a strong rise 
since 2004.26
VULNERABILITIES FROM FOREIGN BORROWING
High levels of foreign liabilities lead to rollover 
and market risk. Rollover risk is particularly 
large if external debt is predominantly of a 
short-term nature. The maturity structure of 
such debt has traditionally been an issue of 
concern in Turkey, but the situation has 
improved substantially in recent years owing 
to the marked lengthening of the maturity of 
banks’ external debt (Table 28).27 In the former 
Owing to a revision based on a new methodology, data on  26 
external debt in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
before 2004 are not comparable.
Data by residual maturity rather than original 27   maturity would be 
a more appropriate measure in this case but unfortunately are not 
available.
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Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the maturity 
structure of the private sector’s external debt is 
still biased towards the short term and there are 
no signs of maturity lengthening, implying 
relatively high rollover risks for both the 
banking and the corporate sectors. In Croatia, 
banks’ share of short-term external debt rose 
steadily until 2006 but has fallen since then, 
while enterprises’ share has remained 
steadily low.
Market risk relates to the exposure of banks 
and enterprises to swings in international 
ﬁ   nancing conditions and to exchange rate 
changes. An assessment of market risks in 
the banking sector is provided in the country 
sections. Regarding the corporate sector, the 
increase in external borrowing may imply 
a widening of the foreign exchange net open 
position built up in the domestic credit market 
(see Section 5.2). Furthermore, at times 
when the availability of funds on a global 
scale declines, local enterprises might ﬁ  nd 
themselves resorting to more expensive 
funding sources.
These increased ﬁ  nancial vulnerabilities imply 
an important role for prudential supervision. 
Although several steps have been taken in 
recent years, further emphasis should be placed 
on banks’ risk management relating to the 
excessive build-up of foreign liabilities, while 
the foreign currency exposures of the corporate 
sector should be closely monitored.
5.4  FINANCIAL STABILITY RISKS FROM 
HOUSEHOLD BORROWING AND DEBT
Bank lending to households has expanded 
rapidly over the past years and has been the 
most dynamic component of overall growth in 
credit to the private sector. While these buoyant 
lending activities reﬂ  ect weak initial conditions 
and are spurred by the prospect of future income 
convergence, they do expose households 
to a range of vulnerabilities. In the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey, 
household debt reached shares of disposable 
income close to those observed in the central 
and eastern European EU Member States, and 
in Croatia this share even surpassed the average 
level in the euro area. In addition, households 
are exposed to foreign currency risks, given 
the popularity of foreign currency-linked debt 
(especially in Croatia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia). Heightened sensitivity 
to asset price ﬂ  uctuations forms another source 
of vulnerability. These risks are mitigated 
by a sizeable build-up of ﬁ  nancial  assets 
of the household sector at the aggregate level, 
but this does not preclude a problematic 
structure of assets and liabilities of   
individual households.
DEVELOPMENTS IN HOUSEHOLD BORROWING AND 
HOUSEHOLD BALANCE SHEETS 
Credit to the household sector has expanded 
briskly over the past years, in line with a trend 
observed in other countries in the region. Since 
Table 28 Banks’ and enterprises’ short-term external debt
(percentage of total outstanding debt)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1)
Banks
Croatia 0.2 0.0 9.9 25.5 27.9 32.9 22.4
FYR Macedonia ... … … 54.6 42.4 42.8 48.6
Turkey 63.0 61.3 71.3 69.4 58.5 46.8 31.1
Enterprises
Croatia 12.1 11.7 10.4 9.1 9.7 8.2 11.2
FYR Macedonia … … … 61.6 66.0 55.3 55.7
Turkey 22.5 23.4 27.1 29.9 29.7 24.8 23.0
Source: National sources.
Note: Liabilities with an original maturity of one year or less are considered as short-term.
1) September 2007.52
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the early 2000s, the outstanding stock of credit 
to households has increased in real terms almost 
ﬁ   ve-fold in Croatia and Turkey and almost 
fourteen-fold in the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (see Chart 8). Credit to households 
has been the most dynamic segment of bank 
lending and its growth rate has signiﬁ  cantly 
outpaced that of total credit to the private sector 
(see Table 29).
Among the different credit types, housing loans 
proved to be the most popular form of 
ﬁ   nancing, with real annual growth rates 
between 26% (Croatia) and 49% (the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). Despite 
high growth rates in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, the share of housing 
loans in total credit to households remains low, 
at 22% in September 2007, due to the low 
starting level and the early development phase 
of the housing market. In the other two 
countries, housing loans constitute a more 
important part of credit to households, with a 
share of 42% in Croatia and 34% in Turkey. 
The prevalence of housing loans in these 
countries may be a sign of increasing 
sophistication of mortgage markets, thereby 
approaching a level closer to countries 
displaying a highly developed market for 
mortgage ﬁ  nance. Moreover, the compression 
of margins on other forms of lending, especially 
to the corporate sector, has rendered real estate 
ﬁ   nancing for the household sector more 
attractive. Lastly, the interplay of rising real 
estate prices with the parallel provision of 
ﬁ  nancing might have played a role. In fact, the 
value of residential real estate in Croatia and 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
rose at an average annual rate of 9% and 5% 
Table 29 Structure and real growth of deposit money banks’ credit to the household sector
(percentages)


















Credit to the private sector 100.0 100.0 100.0 17.7 26.6 12.4
of which:
Credit to the household sector 56.3 35.3 42.9 22.8 42.1 20.8
of which:
Housing loans 41.8 22.0 33.7 25.7 49.0 46.0
Other loans 58.2 78.0 66.3 21.0 40.4 15.2
of which:
Domestic currency-
denominated 30.9 52.2 96.5 43.4 27.2 21.2
Foreign currency-
denominated or -indexed 69.1 47.8 3.5 18.2 77.4 9.1
Sources: National sources, Haver Analytics and own calculations.
1) For FYR Macedonia, the period is limited from January 2004 to September 2007, as a breakdown of household credit before 
January 2004 is unavailable. Comparable real growth rates of credit to the private sector and the household sector between January 2001 
and September 2007 are 16.4% and 42.0% respectively.
Chart 8 Real credit by deposit money banks 
to the household sector
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Sources: National sources, Haver Analytics and own 
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between 2001 and 2006, respectively,28 
triggered by traditional fundamentals as well 
as factors speciﬁ  c to transition economies.29
Foreign currency-denominated or -indexed 
loans were especially widespread in Croatia and 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In 
the latter, they continued to signiﬁ  cantly outpace 
credit denominated in domestic currency. In 
Croatia, in contrast, the popularity of loans 
linked to foreign currency has been diminished 
by administrative and prudential measures by 
the Croatian National Bank. In Turkey, the 
historically high volatility of the lira’s exchange 
rate and restrictions on lending in foreign 
currency to the household sector appear to have 
generally discouraged this form of borrowing.
Rapid expansion of bank lending to households, 
in conjunction with quickly emerging 
additional forms of ﬁ  nancing instruments (e.g. 
leasing), has translated into rising household 
indebtedness. Total liabilities of the household 
sector increased at real annual rates of 25% 
in Croatia and 21% in Turkey between 
2001 and 2006.30 Despite buoyant growth 
rates, households’ ﬁ   nancial liabilities have 
remained below 20% of GDP in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey 
(see Chart 9). In contrast, this ratio has risen to 
around 40% in Croatia, well above the EU-8 
average of around 25% in 2006.
The rise of household liabilities has led to a 
pronounced deterioration in debt serviceability 
indicators. Household debt as a share of 
disposable income reached 18% in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 26% in 
Turkey, approaching the average level observed 
across the EU-8 (32%), though still signiﬁ  cantly 
below the average for the euro area (91%). In 
Croatia, household debt even surpassed the euro 
An indicator gauging price developments of residential real  28 
estate in Turkey is unavailable.
Traditional fundamentals inﬂ  uencing real estate prices include  29 
rising GDP per capita, falling interest rates and demographic 
trends, whereas quality improvements in the housing stock and 
growing external demand are more transition-speciﬁ  c factors.
Data for the corresponding period for the former Yugoslav  30 
Republic of Macedonia is unavailable, as the country did not 
report its household balance sheet before 2005.
Chart 10 Household debt
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1) Weighted averages; EU-8 excludes Slovenia due to lack of data.
Chart 9 Financial assets and liabilities of 
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area level, amounting to 96% of disposable 
income in 2006.31
VULNERABILITIES AND MITIGATING FACTORS 
The rapid growth of household borrowing 
largely reﬂ  ects a low initial level of ﬁ  nancial 
development, coupled with the prospect of 
EU accession and attendant expectations 
concerning future income convergence and 
economic progress. That said, the situation is 
not free from ﬁ   nancial stability risks. Rising 
debt levels expose households to repayment 
risks in the event of deteriorating economic 
conditions and rising unemployment. Such a 
scenario could have signiﬁ  cant negative effects 
for both the ﬁ  nancial sector (an impairment of 
debt service payments would weaken banks’ 
income and capital positions) and the real 
sector (if households start to repair their wealth 
positions, it would dent consumption and further 
depress growth). The observed deterioration in 
debt serviceability indicators implies that such 
repayment risks have increased considerably in 
all three countries.
The rising serviceability risks are partly 
mitigated by the banking sector reform 
undertaken over the past years in all three 
countries and by the build-up of ﬁ  nancial 
or real assets by households. On the latter 
point, households have in fact expanded their 
ﬁ  nancial assets, though at a slower pace than 
their liabilities. In 2006, these assets accounted 
for more than 80% of GDP in Croatia and 
around 50% and 40% of GDP in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey, 
respectively, far outpacing the corresponding 
liabilities, and were mainly concentrated 
in comparatively liquid assets, namely 
bank deposits, securities and mutual funds 
(see Chart 9 above).32 However, debt 
servicing risks also crucially depend on the 
dispersion of assets and liabilities among 
individual households, on which information 
is scarce. Thus, although the situation for 
the household sector on aggregate appears 
favourable, individual households may indeed 
face considerable difﬁ   culties in the case of 
deteriorating economic conditions.
However, debt-based asset accumulation exposes 
households to another series of vulnerabilities:
First, vulnerability to swings in asset    •
prices. Equity prices have been rising in 
the candidate countries for a number of 
years, though with partial corrections from 
late 2007 onwards, and house prices have 
accelerated too.33 If sustainable, the higher 
price levels suggest considerable welfare 
gains for sizeable parts of the population, 
but also a risk of a price reversal if economic 
conditions weaken or interest rates rise. 
Second, vulnerability to currency    •
movements. Currency mismatches are likely 
to arise if household debt is denominated in 
foreign currencies, but assets or incomes are 
in local currency. Available data continue to 
indicate positive net foreign exchange 
positions for the household sector as a whole 
(see Table 30), even though individual 
households may be exposed to sizeable 
currency mismatches.34 In Croatia, the ratio 
of foreign currency-denominated assets to 
corresponding liabilities has declined rapidly 
over the past six years to close to zero.35 
Interest payments as a share of disposable income stood at  31 
2.1% and 4.2% in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
and Turkey respectively, close to the level of 2.7% attained 
in the euro area. It should be noted, though, that Croatia’s 
ﬁ  gures include loan repayments and are therefore not directly 
comparable with those of the other candidate countries. The total 
debt servicing burden of Croatian households as a share of their 
disposable income stood at 7.0% in 2006 against a ratio of 10.4% 
in the euro area.
It is important to note that ﬁ  nancial assets form only part of total  32 
household wealth. Indeed, given the major expansion of housing 
loans in recent years, it appears reasonable to assume that a 
considerable fraction of household wealth is also concentrated in 
real estate. However, comprehensive data on the value of these 
assets is unavailable.
In Zagreb, average house prices in 2005 were the same or higher  33 
than in Brussels, Vienna or Berlin (see Égert and Mihaljek, 
2007).
Comprehensive data on the dispersion of foreign currency- 34 
denominated assets and liabilities across individual households 
are unavailable.
Croatia’s vulnerability may be somewhat smaller than  35 
perceived at ﬁ   rst sight. Workers’ remittances and tourism 
receipts account for 5% and 20% of GDP respectively. These 
might represent additional buffers against potential negative 
foreign exchange shocks, to the extent that some remittances 
are not completely captured in bank deposits and households 
receive some tourism receipts directly in foreign currency. 
See Sorsa et al. (2007).55
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Moreover, at end-2006, around 20% of 
foreign exchange-related loans to the 
non-ﬁ   nancial sector, especially to 
households, were linked to the more volatile 
(when measured against the local currency) 
Swiss franc. By comparison, in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
Turkey, households are far less exposed to 
local currency depreciation, given the large 
share of foreign currency deposits. 
Third, vulnerability due to maturity    •
mismatches. In all countries, maturity risks 
appear limited in aggregate, as households 
hold signiﬁ   cant amounts of liquid assets 
(see Table 31). In addition, more stable 
economic conditions permitted loan 
maturities to lengthen. In 2007, long-term 
credit accounted for around 60%, 75% and 
90% of Turkey’s, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia’s and Croatia’s 
household loan stock respectively.
Fourth, vulnerability to interest rate    •
movements. Available evidence suggests 
that lending at ﬂ   oating interest rates is 
widespread, which could potentially impact 
households’ ability to service their debt, 
especially in an environment of rising 
interest rates.36 However, precise information 
on  ﬁ  xed  and  ﬂ   oating components of 
households’ liabilities is hard to obtain.
5.5  A COMPARISON OF FINANCIAL STABILITY 
INDICATORS WITH THE EU-8
As the candidate countries are experiencing 
rapid economic and institutional convergence 
towards the EU, it is useful to compare their 
ﬁ   nancial situation with that in the EU-8. 
Looking at a list of core ﬁ  nancial  stability 
indicators, there are no large systematic 
differences between the candidate countries 
and the EU-8, although candidate countries 
on average score somewhat lower on banks’ 
proﬁ   tability and asset quality. That said, 
banks’ capital and liquidity levels in candidate 
countries are relatively high compared with 
their peers in the EU-8. This in part reﬂ  ects the 
different stages of ﬁ  nancial sector development 
across countries and is in line with the broader 
degree of advancement in terms of economic 
and institutional convergence.
Banking sector proﬁ   tability in candidate 
countries, measured by return on equity (ROE), 
lagged behind the EU-8 average in 2006, 
especially for Croatia and the former Yugoslav 
See ECB (2007b). In Turkey, however, adjustable rate lending  36 
was prohibited until recently.
Table 30 Foreign currency position of household balance sheets in 2006
(EUR billions, unless indicated otherwise)
Croatia FYR Macedonia Turkey
Foreign currency-denominated or -indexed bank deposits 10.9 0.7 40.0
Foreign currency-denominated or -indexed loans 10.2 0.2 0.7
Net foreign currency-denominated or -indexed assets 0.7 0.5 39.3
Net foreign currency-denominated or -indexed assets as a share of net ﬁ  nancial assets (%) 4.4 27.3 33.6
Sources: Unicredit New Europe Research Network database, national central banks and own calculations.
Table 31 Estimates of households’ liquid 
assets and short-term liabilities in 2006




Currency 11.4 7.3 8.2
Demand deposits 20.6 7.0 8.6
50% of shares and bonds  1) 7.2 22.1 5.6
Total liquid assets 39.2 36.5 22.4
Total short term credit  2) 4.5 3.8 7.3
Net liquid assets 34.7 32.7 15.0
Sources: Unicredit New Europe Research Network database, 
national central banks and own calculations.
1) The assumption that 50% of these assets are liquid is 
arbitrary.
2) Less than 32 month maturity.56
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Republic of Macedonia (see Chart 11). 
However, the lower level of return on equity in 
candidate countries may partly reﬂ  ect  their 
higher levels of capital (i.e. lower leverage). In 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
lower proﬁ  tability may also be explained by 
the comparatively still high cost of credit risk, 
although the ratio of provisioning expenses to 
total income has been continuously decreasing 
in recent years. In Croatia, the decline in bank 
proﬁ  tability in 2006 was due to the fact that 
operating costs and provisioning costs rose 
faster than operating income.37
Candidate countries also score lower on asset 
quality, although this is mostly due to the 
high non-performing loan ratio in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (11%). In 
Croatia and Turkey, asset quality indicators are 
broadly comparable to the average of the EU-8 
countries (see Table 32). A slightly different 
picture emerges, however, if asset quality is 
measured by the ratio of non-performing loans 
(net of provisions) to capital. In Turkey and 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
this coverage ratio is signiﬁ  cantly lower than 
the EU-8 average, indicating both adequate 
provisioning and higher levels of banks’ capital 
in these countries. In contrast, banks in Croatia 
have the highest non-performing loan to capital 
ratio among all countries under investigation. 
As regards indirect credit risk stemming from 
foreign currency lending, it is notable that both 
Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia have relatively high shares 
of foreign currency (and foreign currency-
indexed) loans. The exposure to indirect credit 
risk via foreign currency lending in Turkey 
appears to be relatively contained.
See CNB (2007). 37 
Chart 12 Capital adequacy ratio of banking 
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Sources: ECB and national sources.
Chart 11 Return on equity of banking 
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Macedonia Turkey Lowest Average Highest
Non-performing loans % of total loans 3.2 11.8 3.8 0.2 2.1 3.6
Non-performing loans net of provisions % of capital 12.4 0.7 1.4 1.6 7.4 12.5
Foreign currency loans % of total loans 70.9 52.7 26.5 10.4 48.4 78.2
Sources: ECB, IMF, World Bank and national sources.
Notes: Foreign currency loans also include foreign currency indexed loans. The ratio of non-performing loans net of provisions to capital 
is only available for 2005 for the Czech Republic and Latvia. 57
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Banks’ capital adequacy ratios are signiﬁ  cantly 
higher in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and Turkey than in the EU-8 
(see Chart 12). This mainly reﬂ  ects the still 
low level of credit intermediation in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as well as 
the high share of risk-free assets in total assets 
in Turkey. In Croatia, the capital adequacy 
ratio has been on a downward trend in the past 
years due to the rapid growth of risk-weighted 
assets, although its level is well above the 
average of the EU-8 countries. Generally, 
persistently high credit growth might put 
downward pressure on regulatory capital 
ratios in candidate countries in the future, 
but current high levels of capital indicate that 
banks in the candidate countries are relatively 
well-positioned to absorb potential negative 
shocks.
The liquidity position of the banking systems 
of the candidate countries in general appears 
to be relatively comfortable compared with the 
EU-8. This is underlined by both high liquid 
asset ratios and relatively low loan-to-deposit 
ratios (see Table 33). In particular, banks in 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
and Turkey still maintain a signiﬁ  cant deposit 
surplus. Among the candidate countries, 
Croatia has the highest loan-to-deposit ratio, 
but it is still below the average of the EU-8 
countries. Note however that the EU-8 itself 
is also rather heterogeneous in this respect, 
with loan-to-deposit ratios ranging from 69% 
to 164%. This partly reﬂ   ects the signiﬁ  cant 
differences in the speed of ﬁ  nancial deepening 
in recent years. In particular, in Baltic countries 
where credit growth has been very dynamic 
for a protracted period, bank lending has been 
increasingly funded from non-deposit sources, 
mainly through parent bank funding.




Macedonia Turkey Lowest Average Highest
Liquid assets % of total assets 27.5 31.9 48.0 4.5 23.2 36.5
Loan to deposit ratio 92.5 71.7 70.7 69.3 111.1 164.1
Sources: ECB, IMF and national sources.
Note: Liquid assets ratios are based on the IMF FSI methodology and thus may differ from those in the country tables. Nevertheless, 
liquid assets ratios may still not be fully comparable across countries due to different deﬁ  nitions for liquid assets.58
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Financial systems in Croatia, Turkey and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are at 
very different stages of development. However, 
they are all in a profound transformation 
process characterised by some common 
trends, including ﬁ  nancial deepening, banking 
sector consolidation, a continuing decline in 
the importance of government-owned banks, 
and a move towards core banking activities, 
especially in Turkey where banking activity 
has traditionally been heavily geared towards 
the government securities markets. Also, 
the  ﬁ   nancial landscape in the three countries 
is changing due to deepening international 
integration and increasing participation of 
foreign-owned banks.
This paper argues that this transformation 
process reﬂ  ects a natural and welcome catching-
up phenomenon. Financial systems are maturing, 
converging towards EU standards, providing 
better  ﬁ   nancial intermediation services and 
contributing to sustainable economic growth. 
However, this ﬁ   nancial deepening process is 
also associated with enhanced vulnerability 
to negative shocks. The paper has identiﬁ  ed, 
in particular, a series of macroeconomic and 
ﬁ  nancial risks.
Macroeconomic vulnerabilities relate, ﬁ  rst and 
foremost, to the uncertain economic outlook 
and the growing inﬂ   ationary pressures in 
each of the three countries. Managing upward 
risks to prices in an environment of increased 
macroeconomic uncertainty is a key challenge 
for monetary policy. A related macroeconomic 
risk that is speciﬁ  c to the candidate countries is 
that of a disorderly unwinding of their external 
imbalances, in particular in Croatia and Turkey, 
which run large current account deﬁ  cits. A ﬁ  nal 
macroeconomic risk relates to the structural 
reform agenda, with risks of policy slippages 
and delays in particular in the cases of the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey.
The ﬁ  nancial risks to the banking sector mainly 
relate to the management of credit risk. Credit 
to the private sector grew at annual real rates 
above 20% in 2006, although various central 
bank measures to rein in credit growth have 
contributed to a slowdown to 14% (year 
on year) in September 2007. In the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, credit growth 
has traditionally been more subdued but it has 
accelerated signiﬁ  cantly in recent years, reaching 
40% (year on year) in real terms in September 
2007. In Turkey, ﬁ  nally, real credit growth has 
exceeded 20% per annum since 2003 and stood 
at 36% (year on year) in September 2007.
Rapid credit growth is not a sign of vulnerability 
in itself, but it may lead to a build-up of risk. 
Credit growth can reﬂ   ect catching-up and 
ﬁ   nancial deepening from comparatively low 
starting levels, especially in market segments 
that were very small or largely non-existent a few 
years ago (e.g. mortgage markets in some of the 
candidate countries). Still, in some increasingly 
saturated market segments (e.g. credit cards 
in Croatia and Turkey) competition may force 
banks to relax lending standards, weaken asset 
classiﬁ  cation and provisioning, and reach out to 
new customers that lack a strong credit standing. 
Shortages of well-trained loan ofﬁ  cers, the short 
credit history of many bank customers, possible 
gaps in documentation and limited experience 
so far with credit registers may further aggravate 
the risks in the banks’ loan portfolios.
Credit risks seem most pronounced vis-à-vis 
the household sector. In the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and Turkey household 
debt as a share of disposable income has come 
close to levels observed across the countries 
that joined the EU in 2004, and in Croatia it 
even surpassed the average level in the euro 
area. The already elevated debt service burdens 
could increase further if economic conditions 
were to worsen, possibly impairing debt service 
payments and leading to losses for banks. These 
risks are cushioned at the aggregate level by a 
sizeable build-up of ﬁ  nancial asset holdings of 
households. However, the broadly favourable 
net wealth position of the aggregate household 
sector may mask sizeable differences in the 
situation of individual households.59
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Lending to enterprises has grown less buoyantly 
than lending to households, but still constitutes 
the largest segment of bank credit in the 
candidate countries. As a result, corporate 
sector debt has increased strongly in all three 
countries and reached relatively elevated levels, 
in particular in the case of Croatia. Worsening 
business conditions and a deteriorating 
macroeconomic environment could put some 
strain on the corporate sector’s debt servicing 
capacity.
Ensuring healthy ﬁ  nancial deepening is therefore 
one of the main policy challenges ahead in 
the countries under review. Allowing for the 
rapid development of fully-ﬂ  edged credit and 
deposit markets, without excessive risk-taking 
and without an excessive build-up of external 
vulnerabilities, will remain a difﬁ  cult balancing 
act for policy-makers, requiring careful 
judgement, deep analysis and close monitoring.60
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